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Cognitive biases play a fundamental part in franchisor-
franchisee deal making. Ordinarily, franchisors have more 
power and information than do franchisees. The disparity 
between these parties is often exacerbated by the franchisees’ 
psychological dispositions. Are franchisees biased or 
uninformed to the extent that they cannot evaluate the 
information franchisors present to them? The franchisees’ 
sound judgment may be undermined by well-recognized 
cognitive biases such as anchoring, confirmation bias, the 
bandwagon effect, and escalation of commitment.
To gather data specifically about potential cognitive biases in 
the franchising context, this article incorporates a survey of 
franchisees; it provides empirical evidence of the limited 
perspective and flawed decision-making of most persons who 
buy a franchise. The article concludes by exploring potential 
reforms intended to enhance the franchise bargaining process. 
Certain legal frameworks as well as business practices, both 
domestic and international, offer promising means to combat 
franchisees’ cognitive biases. Those legal and business 
structures, in turn, should lead to more even-handed contracts 
and to better long-term franchise relationships.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive biases are “systematic pattern[s] of deviation from norm 
or rationality in judgment, whereby inferences about other people and 
situations may be drawn in an illogical fashion.” 1 In some fields, 
cognitive biases may take on a more specific meaning, such as – in 
discrimination law – “the use of categories that are themselves shaped 
or contaminated by confining stereotypes and habitual ways of 
thinking about nondominant groups in our society.”2 When applied in 
the context of franchising, cognitive biases are better understood by 
the more general definition. Franchising harbors these biases via a
                                                
1 See Martie G. Haselton, Daniel Nettle & Damian R. Murray, The Evolution of 
Cognitive Bias, in THE HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 724 (David M. 
Buss ed., 2005). Cognitive biases systematically distort objective reality. Martie G. 
Haselton, Daniel Nettle & Damian R. Murray, The Evolution of Cognitive Bias, in 
THE HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 968 (David M. Buss ed., 2nd ed. 
2016).
2 Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 
U. PA. L. REV. 463, 467 (1998).
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business arrangement3 whereby a franchisor grants a franchisee the 
right or license 4 to market goods, services, or both under the 
franchisor's trademark5 or trade name.6 It has long been an attractive 
option for people looking to own and run a business in the United 
States without actually starting out alone and on the ground floor;
instead, the franchisee is able to operate within a network of franchised 
businesses sharing a community of interests and ensconced in what is 
supposed to be an extensive, long-term system of support (e.g., 
training and advertising) overseen by a capable, experienced 
franchisor. A franchisor and its franchisees are part of a business 
organization not altogether different from vertical integration.7
The franchise sector of the United States economy grew from 
697,943 franchise establishments in 2013 to 759,236 establishments at 
the start of 2018, an annual growth rate of about 1.7%.8 Although 
franchised businesses only make up about 3% of the businesses in the 
United States, 9 the franchising sector as a whole is an economic 
                                                
3 See Franchising, WEBFINANCING, INC., BUSINESS DICTIONARY (2013), 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/franchising.html.
4 See Franchise, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/franchise (last visited Dec. 20, 2018).
5 Caron Beesley, The Difference Between a Trade Name and a Trademark-And 
Why You Can’t Overlook Either, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. BLOG (Sep. 19, 2016),
https://www.sba.gov/blogs/difference-between-trade-name-and-trademark-and-
why-you-cant-overlook-either (“A trademark is used to protect your brand name 
and can also be associated with your trade name . . . Registering a trademark 
guarantees exclusive use, establishes legally that your mark is not already being 
used, and provides government protection from any liability or infringement issues 
that may arise.”).
6 Id. (stating a trade name is the official name under which a company does 
business – a “doing business as” (DBA) name. Sole proprietors, partnerships, 
existing corporations or LLCs need a DBA designation).
7 See G. Frank Mathewson & Ralph A. Winter, The Economics of Franchise 
Contracts, 28 J.L. & ECON. 503 (1985).
8 IHS MARKIT ECON., FRANCHISE BUSINESS ECONOMIC OUTLOOK FOR 2018 2
(2018), 
https://www.franchise.org/sites/default/files/Franchise_Business_Outlook_Jan_201
8.pdf (referring to 2018 figure of the “Franchise Business Economic Outlook: 
January 2018 Forecast” table); IHS MARKIT ECON., FRANCHISE BUSINESS 
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK FOR 2017 2 (2017), 
http://www.franchise.org/sites/default/files/Franchise%20Business%20Economic%
20Outlook%20January%202017.pdf (referring to 2013 figures of the “Franchise 
Business Economic Outlook: January 2017” table).
9 OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS ABOUT SMALL BUSINESS 3 (Aug. 2017), 
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/advocacy/SB-FAQ-2017-WEB.pdf (2.9% of 
all firms are franchises, with 2.3% of nonemployer firms being franchises, as are 
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powerhouse—totaling $2.3 trillion dollars in revenues.10 Prospective 
franchisees must learn a substantial amount of information regarding 
costs, franchisor controls, and contractual obligations.11 Furthermore,
decisions such as how initially to staff and finance the business, as well 
as whether to hire a franchise attorney, and – if so – what attorney to 
hire, are equally important considerations for the future franchisee to 
make before completing the purchase of a franchise. 12 However,
many franchise candidates fail to perform due diligence before buying 
that franchise.13 Instead, aspiring franchisees oftenerroneously assume
that an opportunity must be profitable if a franchisor has more than one 
unit and a good product.14
In the United States, most states simply depend on the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC), through its Franchise Rule, to define 
franchising and to require a disclosure from franchisor to franchisee, 
with no mandatory public filing let alone any franchising-specific 
                                                
5.3% of small employers and 9.6% of large employers – those having more than 
500 employees, id. at 1–2). The survival rate between independent businesses and 
franchises is similar, with each prospective business owner having an assortment of 
factors—managerial talent, sales abilities—to think about when deciding between 
an independent business or franchise arrangement. OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, U.S. 
SMALL BUS. ADMIN., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT SMALL BUSINESS 2
(Sept. 2012), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/FAQ_Sept_2012.pdf.
10 Matt Haller, CNBC’s Behind the Counter: What They Left “Untold” About 
Franchising, INT’L FRANCHISE ASS’N (last visited Dec. 20, 2018), 
http://www.franchise.org/cnbc%E2%80%99s-behind-the-counter-what-they-left-
%E2%80%9Cuntold%E2%80%9D-about-franchising-0 (noting that, according to 
CNBC’s “Behind the Counter” documentary, U.S. franchising comprises $2.3 
trillion and, despite some recent economic downturns, the “franchise industry” is 
growing).
11 FED. TRADE COMM’N, A CONSUMER’S GUIDE TO BUYING A FRANCHISE 1 (June 
2015), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/consumers-guide-
buying-franchise (last edited June 2015).
12 See Charles Internicola, 5 Factors to Consider Before Buying a Franchise,
INTERNICOLA LAW FIRM (Jan. 24, 2014),
http://www.franchiselawsolutions.com/blog/5-factors-to-consider-before-buying-a-
franchise/ (Internicola describes the FDD as an important “life line” that should be 
reviewed with an experienced franchise lawyer. An evaluation of expectations, and 
whether or not the legal rights set forth in the FDD accurately match expectations 
are at the core of the review, according to Internicola).
13 Id. (discussing the pre-signing research that franchisees typically fail to 
perform). See Justin Kruger & David Dunning, Unskilled and Unaware of it: How 
Difficulties in Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-
Assessments, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1121, 1121 (1999) (reviewing 
the longstanding evidence that people frequently do not know that they fail to know 
what they need to know).
14 Internicola, supra note 12.
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substantive regulation. 15 About a third of the states do define 
franchises in the same way, while a handful of others adopt their own
definition. 16 In twelve states (California, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Maryland, Michigan, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Virginia, 
Washington, and Wisconsin), a franchise must adhere to three 
elements: a marketing plan, an association with trademark, and a 
required fee. 17 However, in the states of Hawaii, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Nebraska, and South Dakota, the law defines a franchise 
by the following three elements: Trademark license, community of 
interest, and a required fee. 18 Two of the three elements – the 
trademark and the mandatory fee – thus appear in all state law 
definitions 19 as well as the FTC definition. 20 Even the somewhat 
                                                
15 See Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Contract Interpretation: A Two-Standard 
Approach, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 641, 661–62 (2013).
16 See U.S Franchise Law Basics, VINSON FRANCHISE LAW FIRM,
http://franchiselaw.net/startups/usfranchiselawbasics.html (last visited Dec. 20, 
2018); Emerson, supra note 15, at 661–62. See also 16 C.F.R. § 436.1(h) (2018) 
(codifying the definition of “franchise”). 
17 Id. If all three elements are present, then the relationship is considered a 
“franchise” for purposes of the FTC Franchise Rule. State law mandates various 
restrictions and requirements on franchise relationships. These include: 
Encroachment, Free Association, Good Faith/Reasonableness, Management, 
Marketing Fees, Non-Compete Agreements, Non-Discrimination, Non-Waiver, and 
Required Purchases. Id.
18 Id.
19 See 62B Am. Jur. 2d Private Franchise Contracts § 17 (2018) (“A minimum 
purchase requirement can be a franchise fee if the distributors were required to 
purchase amounts or items that they would not purchase otherwise…[a] charge for 
a literature package and a ‘bookkeeping entry’ fee have been held to constitute a 
franchise fee.”). 
20 The FTC Rule defines a franchise using the typical three elements of trademark, 
control or assistance, and a mandatory fee:
Franchise means any continuing commercial relationship or arrangement, 
whatever it may be called, in which the terms of the offer or contract 
specify, or the franchise seller promises or represents, orally or in writing, 
that: (1) The franchisee will obtain the right to operate a business that is 
identified or associated with the franchisor's trademark, or to offer, sell, or 
distribute goods, services, or commodities that are identified or associated 
with the franchisor's trademark; (2) The franchisor will exert or has 
authority to exert a significant degree of control over the franchisee's 
method of operation, or provide significant assistance in the franchisee's 
method of operation; and (3) As a condition of obtaining or commencing 
operation of the franchise, the franchisee makes a required payment or 
commits to make a required payment to the franchisor or its affiliate.
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varying third element is not that different from one legal definition to 
another. As outlined in the franchise definition of the twelve states, 
above, the “marketing plan” is a system prescribed by the franchisor 
that provides franchisees with the rights and methods to offer, sell, or 
distribute goods or services under the franchisor’s trademark or trade 
name. 21 This actually differs only slightly from the “trademark 
license”22 element adopted by the other five states, above, in which
franchisees have the right to offer, sell, or distribute the franchisor's 
goods or services through use of the franchisor's trademark or trade 
name. So, the problem for new franchisees is not so much the legal 
definition of their arrangement with the franchisor, but rather, what 
these franchisees know, expect, and thus depend upon with respect to 
that incipient, long-term franchise relationship.
Upon signing a franchising agreement, are franchisees acting on 
distorted representations of reality and are they, therefore, cognitively
“biased”?23 More specifically, are prospective franchisees unable to 
evaluate objectively the information that franchisors present to them 
because of certain internal or external variables? These internal 
variables include shame or lack of self-control,24 while the external 
variables include the uncertainty and discomfort surrounding the ever-
changing business environment.25 Cognitivebiases such as anchoring,26
                                                
16 C.F.R. § 436.1(h) (2018) (emphasis in original).
21 62B Am. Jur. 2d Private Franchise Contracts § 17 (2018).
22 Id.
23 See Chamallas, supra note 2, at 467.
24 Govind Persad, When, and How, Should Cognitive Bias Matter to Law, 32 LAW 
& INEQ. 31, 42 (2014).
25 See Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of 
Values and Cognitive Style, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 649, 722 (2004).
26 Persad, supra note 24; Shana Lebowitz & Drake Baer, 20 Cognitive Biases That 
Screw Up Your Decisions, BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 6, 2015, 11:44 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/cognitive-biases-affect-decisions-2015-8/#zero-
risk-bias-220 (Anchoring occurs when one is over-reliant on the first piece of 
information one receives; consequently, any information received later is viewed in 
light of the initial information and adjusted accordingly.). For an example of 
anchoring, see Joe Lau & Jonathan Chan, Cognitive Biases, CRITICAL THINKING 
WEB (2015), http://philosophy.hku.hk/think/fallacy/biases.php (University of Hong 
Kong). Prior to describing examples of cognitive biases, namely those relating to 
probability, the authors ask the question of how big the country of Namibia’s 
population is—whether it is above or below 100 million. Id. The answer is revealed 
to be around 2.3 million as of 2013, and the answer’s explanation further states that 
many people would probably give an estimate that is much higher because of the 
way that the question was phrased—offering a set parameter of above or below 100 
million within the question leads people to make decisions based on “anchoring,” 
where a piece of information acts as an anchor from which people making 
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the bandwagon effect, 27 confirmation bias, 28 and escalation of
commitment29 are all used as mental shortcuts in the decision-making
process.30
Through the use of these mental shortcuts, franchisees are likely to 
be less objective and more likely to succumb to errors in reasoning.
For example, we can easily imagine how three common cognitive 
biases – overconfidence, the illusion of control, and the belief in the 
law of small numbers – can be applied to our own understanding of the 
purchase and ownership of franchises. Overconfidence, the failure to 
know the limits of one’s knowledge,31 can be a potent factor in the 
thought process of a franchisee. For example, the franchisee may 
believe that he or she understands an entire Franchise Disclosure 
Document32 and therefore does not need to hire a franchise attorney.
Secondly, the illusion of control occurs when an individual 
overemphasizes the extent to which her skill strengthens her 
performance in situations when, in actuality, chance plays a heavy role 
and skill is not necessarily the decisive factor. 33 In our situation, 
franchisees may rely (to their detriment) on their business acumen or 
their previously successful negotiating style. In fact, their current 
playing field – the competition, along with the business conditions –
differs from what the franchisees previously encountered.
                                                
decisions use to make minor adjustments from their assessment of the information.
Id.
27 See Lebowitz & Baer, supra note 26 (noting that the bandwagon effect occurs 
because the probability of one person adopting a belief increases based on the 
number of other people who hold that belief).
28 Id. (stating that confirmation bias is the tendency to listen only to information 
that confirms preconceived notions). 
29 Escalation of Commitment, WEBFINANCING, INC., BUSINESS DICTIONARY
(2013), http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/escalation-of-
commitment.html (noting that escalation of commitment is the “[t]endency to 
invest additional resources in an apparently losing proposition, influenced by effort, 
money, and time already invested.”).
30 See Mark Simon, Susan M. Houghton & Karl Aquino, Cognitive Biases, Risk 
Perception, and Venture Formation: How Individuals Decide to Start Companies,
15 J. BUS. VENTURING 113 (1999) (studying the effects of cognitive biases 
including overconfidence, illusion of control, and the belief in the law of small 
numbers).
31 Id. at 113. See Kruger & Dunning, supra note 13.
32 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, FRANCHISE RULE 16 C.F.R. PART 436
COMPLIANCE GUIDE (May 2008), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/bus70-franchise-rule-
compliance-guide.pdf [hereinafter Franchise Rule Compliance Guide].
33 See Simon, Houghton & Aquino, supra note 30, at 113.
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Overconfidence and the illusion of control thus may each bolster the 
other’s faulty reasoning to produce, for the franchisee, a rash 
conclusion.
The last of the three common biases mentioned immediately 
above, the belief in the law of small numbers, occurs when an 
individual uses a small sample of information to draw firm and broad
conclusions. 34 When subject to this particular bias, prospective
franchisees cling only to those details that appear favorable at first 
glance, such as the franchisor allowing the franchisee an opportunity 
to purchase more than one franchise at a time, although the franchisee 
may not be receiving a great deal. Thus, a franchisee may “anchor,” or 
heavily depend upon, the first bit of information received in 
negotiations. 35 For example, an alluring sales pitch may lead
franchisees to make a quick judgment or act on information without 
placing equal reliance on subsequent information that could be just as 
valuable.36
We can deduce the ways in which franchisees may fool themselves 
or otherwise fall prey to poor reasoning processes, but it is best to 
ground public policy on empirical evidence when possible. Therefore, 
a short survey was developed and sent to franchisees across the United 
States. The survey’s purpose was to determine whether and how
franchisees fall victim to cognitive biases when entering into franchise 
agreements. Over 200 franchisees responded to the survey,37 and the 
questions as well as the response data are recorded in the Appendix to 
this article.
                                                
34 Id. at 114.
35 See Lebowitz & Baer, supra note 26. We thus see how two cognitive biases –
here, anchoring and the belief in the law of small numbers, may reinforce one 
another. 
36 See Brian P. Kane, Are Cognitive Biases Impeding Your Legal Advice under 
Rule 2.1, 58 ADVOCATE 23, 23 (Oct. 2015) (providing another example of 
anchoring in Harry Potter). 
37 At a 95% confidence level, with a sample size (N) of 203 franchisees, a 
population (p) of approximately 744,437 franchisees in the United States, and a 
percentage of 50% as a “worst case percentage” used to determine a general level 
of accuracy (see https://www.surveysystem.com/sscalc.htm), our survey’s 
confidence interval is approximately 6.88. Our margin of error is approximately +/-
6.88% for our given sample size. According to SurveyStar, a leading provider of 
survey management, data entry, survey coding, data processing, and tabulation 
services to researchers worldwide, an “acceptable” margin of error used by survey 
researchers falls between 4% and 8% at the 95% confidence level. Thus, our 
survey’s results are reliable to within +/- 6.88% at the 95% confidence level. See 
What Every Researcher Should Know about Statistical Significance, DATASTAR
(Oct. 2008)), http://www.surveystar.com/startips/significance.pdf.
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II. THE ROLE OF LAWYERS IN FRANCHISING
The lawyer’s advice is a key component in franchising, both for 
franchisors and, although often “honored” by omission, for 
franchisees. 38 For would-be franchisees, there are numerous pre-
contractual disclosures indispensable to analyzing a franchise’s 
business prospects, many legal concepts and business customs that 
inform everyone about franchise standards and practice, and a short 
timeframe for undertaking all preparatory work and – when applicable
– successfully dealing with the franchisor.
A. Preliminary Information for the Franchisee to Consider
Prior to signing an agreement with the franchisor, the franchisee 
has a plethora of information to consider.39 Under the rules that the 
FTC promulgated in 1979 and amended in 2007, the franchisor must 
provide a Franchise Disclosure Document (FDD) to the franchise
candidate at least 14 calendar days before a binding agreement is 
signed.40 The FDD includes items such as franchise litigation history, 
bankruptcy, initial fees and financing, intellectual property 
information 41 and numerous other items pertinent to an aspiring
                                                
38 See Robert W. Emerson, Fortune Favors the Franchisor: Survey and Analysis of 
the Franchisee’s Decision Whether to Hire Counsel, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 709
(2014).
39 See Haller, supra note 10.
40 Franchise Rule Compliance Guide, supra note 32. According to the Compliance 
Guide, since July 1, 2007, franchisors could comply with the FTC’s disclosure 
requirements by using any one of the following formats: (1) the original Franchise 
Rule; (2) the Uniform Franchise Offering Circular “UFOC”; or (3) the amended 
Franchise Rule. However, as of July 1, 2008, all franchisors must use only the 
amended Franchise Rule. Id. Additionally, the Compliance Guide states that a 
commercial business arrangement is a “franchise” if it satisfies three definitional 
elements: the franchisor must (1) promise to provide a trademark or other 
commercial symbol; (2) promise to exercise significant control or provide 
significant assistance in the operation of the business; and (3) require a minimum 
payment of at least $500 during the first six months of operations.
41 See Joel Libava, Franchise Lawyers: When to Use One, U.S. SMALL BUS.
ADMIN. BLOG (June 5, 2012), https://www.sba.gov/blogs/franchise-lawyers-when-
use-one. The Guest Blogger for this particular post, “Franchise King” Joel Libava, 
makes the very important, albeit obvious, point that the franchise agreement is “not 
that easy to read,” since a majority of the wording is in legalese. Id. According to 
Libava, the FDD “can easily be 200-300 pages long” and franchisees “probably 
won’t be able to digest all of it in one sitting.” Id. Libava also states that the 
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franchisee’s decision to “buy in.” 42 It is important to note that 
franchise agreements can last 10 to 20 years and command an 
investment of $250,000 or more.43
Between 2014 and 2016, FRANdata, a research and consulting 
firm that specializes in performance analysis and benchmarks for 
franchising,44 examined the quality of the FPR (financial performance 
representations) disclosures (Item 19 of the FDD) from a
representative sample of 259 brands.45 Through the use of surveys, 
FRANdata gained important insight into how prospective franchisees 
use the FPR and ultimately decide to make their investment 
decisions.46 These practices may be especially meaningful inasmuch 
as the FTC places few limits on how or what specific information the 
franchisor discloses. 47 According to 16 C.F.R. § 436 (Disclosure 
Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising – also known 
as the FTC Franchise Rule), the FTC expressly permits the electronic 
dissemination of a FDD both by email and by permitting a prospective 
franchisee access to the FDD on the franchisor’s website. 48 The 
franchise candidate could even show that he or she received the FDD 
by clicking on a “submit” button on the FDD’s receipt page (even 
                                                
franchisors are just trying to “protect themselves” and the franchisee can do the 
same thing by “hiring a qualified franchise attorney.” Id.
42 16 C.F.R. § 436.5(a) (2018). For a discussion on the items, see Uri Benoliel, Are 
Disclosures Really Standardized?, 62 VILL. L. REV. 1 (2017). 
43 See Cindy Skrzycki, Opinion, FTC’s Proposed Changes in Franchise Rules 
Elicit Chain Reactions, WASH. POST (Apr. 19, 2005), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/04/18/AR2005041801774.html; see also Sioux Falls Pizza 
Co., Inc. v. Little Caesar Enterprises, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1055 (D.S.D. 
2012) (evaluating franchisor’s termination of an automatically renewing ten-year 
franchise agreement).
44 What We Do, FRANdata, http://www.frandata.com/about-us/ (last visited Dec. 
20, 2018). 
45 FRANdata, Market Demand Pushing Higher Levels of Transparency, Financial 
Performance Representation, INT’L FRANCHISING ASSOC. FRANCHISE EDUC. & RES.
FOUND. (Apr. 2017)
http://franchise.org/sites/default/files/2017-
Financial_Performance_Representations_final.pdf (The FPR is intended to be a 
more nuanced, updated term for that which the UFOC called “earnings claims.”).
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 16 C.F.R. § 436.2(c), § 436.6 (2018). See also Michael K. Lindsey, Technology: 
The New Frontier in Intellectual Property, in THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
HANDBOOK: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR FRANCHISE, BUSINESS, AND IP COUNSEL
279, 286–87 (Christopher P. Bussert & James R. Sims III eds., 2d ed. 2016) 
(discussing the FTC Rule, the FDD, and franchisor websites).
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though the FTC Rule prohibits external hyperlinks).49 While potential 
franchisees owe themselves a large measure of due diligence before 
buying a franchise, the FDD should reinforce that duty to self: absent 
such a disclosure of pertinent information, prospective franchisees are 
not led toward, or otherwise assisted in acquiring, more realistic 
expectations of the return from a franchise.50 They are, in a sense,
simply left on their own. 
After its study, FRANdata concluded that the better brands—that 
is, the better franchises—disclose optional information in FDD Item 
19 more often than brands that do not.51 However, not every FPR 
“revelation” is in fact accurate; it could even be purposeful 
misrepresentation. Since the 1970s, the FTC has filed over 200 
lawsuits against violators of the FTC Franchise Rule, many for false 
earning claims, 52 including franchisor behavior which may be so 
informal that commentators and franchisees have labeled it “cocktail 
napkin disclosure.” 53 Similarly, lawsuits based on state law have 
arisen as a result of other fraudulent information included in disclosure 
documents. 54 Furthermore, franchisors themselves also frequently 
bring lawsuits against franchisees to enforce franchise agreements or 
terminate those agreements based on franchisee conduct.55
                                                
49 Id. See also Amended Franchise Rule FAQ’s, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/business-center/guidance/amended-franchise-rule-faqs (2014) (section 
436.6(d) of the amended Franchise Rule prohibits franchisors from including in any 
electronic (franchise) disclosure document external links to materials outside of the 
disclosure document itself).
50 See FRANdata, supra note 45, at 2.
51 See Id., at 3.
52 See Skrzycki, supra note 43.
53 Id.; See also HAROLD BROWN ET AL., FRANCHISING REALITIES AND REMEDIES
51 (Law Journal Press rev. ed. 2003).
54 See Motor City Bagels, LLC v. Amer. Bagel Co., 50 F.Supp.2d 460 (D. Md. 
June 7, 1999) (regarding alleged misrepresentations as to franchise start-up costs); 
JMF, Inc. v. Med. Shoppe Int’l, Inc., 2011 WL 4369475 at 3 (D.N.D. Sep. 19, 
2011) (challenging a franchisor’s failure to follow a “Most Favored Nations 
Clause”). However, false earning claims are not always successful, especially if the 
franchisor includes disclaimers in its disclosures. See, e.g., Ayu’s Global Tire, LLC 
v. Big O Tires, LLC, 2013 WL 2298585 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d May 24, 2013) (ruling in 
favor of franchisor on a number of claims of fraudulent information in disclosure 
documents); Steak n Shake Enterprises, Inc. v. Globex Co., LLC, 110 F.Supp.3d 
1057, 1084 (D. Col. June 23, 2015) (holding that projected earnings statements 
were not fraudulent because of disclaimer and clarifications that the earnings were 
simply estimates), aff’d 659 F. App’x. 506 (10th Cir. 2016).
55 See, e.g., Barry Cook Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 616 So. 2d 512, 513 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (regarding termination of franchise agreement because 
franchisee engaged in “conduct . . . unbecoming a reputable businessman”); see
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B. Hard Law and Soft Law
Commentators and academics define the term, “regulation,” with 
many different meanings.56 Similarly, the terms “hard law” and “soft 
law” can be defined in countless ways. 57 The term “hard law”
describes the traditional process of regulation and the way that laws 
are enforced by the courts. “Soft law” describes regulations outside of 
the traditional process.58 The recent trend in scholarship is to “view 
regulation broadly.” 59 While the aforementioned FDD disclosure
rules may be viewed as “hard law,” the ambiguity, breadth of 
coverage, and confusion that franchisees face with respect to 
disclosure rules suggest that these requirements should have a broader 
interpretation, beyond just literal wording, to be characterized as “soft 
law,” something in line with “aspirational guidelines and statements of 
best practices.”60 In other words, some disclosures must be made 
under explicit rules (hard law), and other disclosures should be made
in order to meet implied expectations (soft law). Instead, when
franchisees sign their franchise agreements without fully 
understanding the overly broad terms in the agreements, the franchisor
effectively acquires a broad right to end its business relationship with 
the franchisee for any number of potential franchisee breaches 
furnishing the franchisor with “good cause” to terminate.61 Under 
hard law that is inflexible, a franchise agreement would normally be 
binding, but, with overly broad terms within franchising agreements, 
a franchisor grants itself the opportunity to treat the agreement as 
flexible soft law, invoked at the franchisor’s discretion.62
                                                
also Robert W. Emerson, Franchising Hard Law and Soft Law, in HANDBOOK OF 
RESEARCH ON FRANCHISING 137–168 (Francis Hoy, Rozenn Perrigot & Andrew 
Terry, eds., 2017) (discussing franchise contract standards and grounds for 
termination based on various concepts ranging from iron-clad, or close thereto, 
laws to “mere” notions of good or fair behavior). 
56 See ELIZABETH CRAWFORD SPENCER, THE REGULATION OF FRANCHISING IN THE 
NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY 1–15 (Edward Elgar Pub. 2010). 
57 See Emerson, supra note 55.
58 Id.
59 Vincent R. Johnson, Nanotechnology, Environmental Risks, and Regulatory 
Options, 121 PENN ST. L. REV. 471, 497–98 (2016).
60 Id.; see also Emerson, supra note 55, at 137.
61 See generally Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Terminations: “Good Cause” 
Decoded, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 103 (2016) (discussing various judicial and 
legislative approaches to good cause terminations). 
62 Emerson, supra note 55, at 137.
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Ordinarily, a would-be franchisee needs representation and advice 
from a lawyer learned in franchise law and experienced in franchising 
business practices. Otherwise, that prospective franchisee may fail to 
recognize the subtleties of franchise law and business – the hard law 
and the soft law. Along a continuum of behavior, what the franchisee
or franchisor must do, should do, can do, should refrain from doing, or
absolutely must not do are all matters of knowledge, judgment, and 
reason for which professional guidance, especially including that of 
lawyers, is essential.
C. The Fourteen-Day Window
The FTC requires franchisors to distribute a complete FDD, with 
exhibits, to prospective franchisees. The franchisor, affiliates, 
predecessors, and parents must disclose to the franchisor any pending 
legal actions, past convictions or judgments, as well as material civil 
actions involving the franchise, and must do so in a manner complying 
with the FTC’s fourteen-day rule. 63 These disclosures provide the 
franchisee with an overview as to the viability of the franchise itself. 
Moreover, during the fourteen-day FDD window, an aspiring 
franchisee may decide to employ the services of an accomplished,
knowledgeable franchise attorney.64
The fourteen-day rule poses an interesting problem. While this 
two-week period is a static timeline, with the proposed franchise 
agreement only available for signing on or beyond the fourteenth day 
after the franchisee received the FDD from the franchisor, the question 
remains: Does the fourteen-day rule in practice sometimes place 
franchisees in an even weaker state for evaluating and perhaps 
negotiating over a franchise opportunity? This is due to the hurdles that 
a franchise candidate must overcome to honor the duty to oneself of 
due diligence: evaluating everything disclosed, following up on all 
issues raised therefrom, and hiring needed experts, such as a franchise 
attorney. If there is implicit pressure on a franchise applicant either to 
accept a franchise offer shortly after the 14-day period has lapsed, or 
to decline the offer without delay, then that rapidly expiring two-week 
interlude may place enormous pressure – a real “nudge” – on the 
applicant. 65 On its face, the FTC Rule requires the franchisor to 
                                                
63 Franchise Rule Compliance Guide, supra note 32, at 37. 
64 See Internicola, supra note 12.
65 See infra notes 246–257 and accompanying text (on nudging).
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provide a FDD as soon as it reasonably can. 66 With a practical 
deadline on the franchisee not much beyond that 14-day timeframe, 
franchisees are disproportionately affected (lacking any significant 
bargaining power). Therefore, franchisees are often compelled to 
contend with a complex document and insufficient opportunity to 
comprehensively and effectively evaluate the proposed franchise 
investment. 
Franchise attorneys know what to focus on in FDDs and in the 
contractual agreement. 67 However, with franchise attorneys 
commanding a $2,000-$5,000 upfront retainer, along with hourly rates 
of $350 to $800,68 it is unsurprising that many franchisees ultimately 
do not hire a franchise attorney to review FDDs.69 While this high cost 
may merely be a heightened burden for some franchise applicants, it 
proves to slow or outright preclude the franchise process for others 
who cannot afford to spend that much money before their business 
commences. Past studies have shown that franchisees visit their family 
lawyer or a friend for counsel instead of obtaining advice from an 
attorney skilled in franchise matters.70 In addition to cost, the largest 
deterrent to hiring an attorney is the franchisee’s desire to maintain 
control over his or her process.71
                                                
66 Franchise Rule Compliance Guide, supra note 32, at 124. Literally, it is merely 
a time period, which the franchisor must provide the FDD and not a hard and fast 
rule for signing the agreement; thus, it again unduly burdens franchisees, as it 
disproportionately affects one’s negotiating position.
67 See VINSON FRANCHISE LAW FIRM, supra note 16.
68 Kevin B. Murphy, Cost to Review Franchise Disclosure Documents (FDD),
HG.ORG. (2014) (July 27, 2018), https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/cost-to-review-
franchise-disclosure-documents-fdd-5388. Murphy describes the “very dry and 
technical” Franchise Disclosure Document as something you would “read if you’re 
having trouble getting to sleep at night.” Id. He also states that there is a disturbing 
trend of newly established franchises are bound to extraordinarily unfair contract 
provisions that they ignored during the contract formation process (gathering 
information, negotiation, and closing the deal). It is the role and function of a 
franchise attorney “to see the flashing red lights that [a prospective franchisee] does 
not even notice.” Id.
69 Ronald K. Gardner, Jr. & Julianne Lusthaus, Representing Franchisees, in 
FUNDAMENTALS OF FRANCHISING 329 (Rupert M. Barkoff et al. eds., 4th ed. 2015) 
(stating that most franchisees fail to hire an attorney).
70 See Emerson, supra note 38, at 719 (2014) (including comments from franchise 
attorneys and a survey of franchise lawyers).
71 See Nika Kabiri, Why People Don’t Hire Lawyers – And No, It’s Not Because 
They Hate You (part 3 of 5), LAWYERNOMICS BY AVVO (Dec. 3, 2015), 
http://lawyernomics.avvo.com/legal-marketing/why-people-dont-hire-lawyers-and-
no-its-not-because-they-hate-you-part-3-of-5.html.
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If a prospective franchisee decides not to hire a franchise attorney, 
then the franchisee remains solely responsible for comprehending the 
language of the FDD. This requires the franchisee to extract, on his or 
her own, important information from the FDD, a proactive, 
precautionary measure which, in effect, could serve to deter or detect
fraudulent conduct. However, to undertake a thorough inquiry of the
FDD and the franchise’s prospects requires much hard work and often 
is counter to predispositions or inclinations when under the spell of a 
cognitive bias. Regulators and others well versed in franchised 
businesses and the law thereof strongly discourage the “going it alone”
approach to evaluating a franchise offer, which is a foolish attitude (not 
even a tactic) that leaves would-be franchisees vulnerable to their own 
mistakes and to others’ avarice and fraud.72 So, at this point in the 
negotiations, has the soon-to-be franchisee involved friends or family 
in the decision-making process?73 Has he or she “anchored” on a 
particular piece of information that has guided his or her thinking when 
considering the deal, 74 or does the prospective franchisee have 
alternatives to the franchise under consideration? 75 In addition, do 
franchisees turn to the Internet to look for answers to their questions?76
If so, confirmation bias may be at play, with the franchisees seeking 
specific information to confirm their already-established beliefs or 
theories.77 The answers to all of these questions about friends, family, 
information sets, alternative investments, and the Internet reveal just a 
                                                
72 See New York State Office of the Attorney General, Eric T. Schneiderman, 
Investor Protection Bureau, Franchise Section, What to Consider Before Buying a 
Franchise, https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/franchise_booklet.pdf. (“[one] 
should not attempt to extract important FDD information…unless [one has] 
considerable background regarding franchise documents or if one is already 
involved in the type of business [being considered] . . . Relying on the FDD 
without consulting a professional and hoping that the franchisor has told the truth is 
setting [oneself] up for potential fraud.”).
73 Infra App., Survey on Franchise Agreements, Question 6 (comments on file 
with authors).
74 Infra App., Survey on Franchise Agreements, Question 2 (comments on file 
with authors).
75 Infra App., Survey on Franchise Agreements, Question 3 (comments on file 
with authors).
76 Various websites offer legal information or services for a flat fee. Franchise 
Disclosure Document Review, LEGALZOOM,
https://www.legalzoom.com/attorneys/franchise-disclosure-documents-review.html 
(last visited Dec. 20, 2018). 
77 See Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in 
Many Guises, 2 REVIEW OF GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 178 (1998). 
OHIO STATE BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:116
few of the many factors that cognitively influence, for better or for 
worse, the decision to reach a binding contract with the franchisor.
III. VARIABLES TESTED, AND HYPOTHESES
Over forty years ago, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman 
comprehensively studied human judgment and decision-making from 
a cognitive bias perspective. 78 Cognitive biases are “mental 
shortcuts”–cognitive limitations and heuristics–79 constituting mental 
tools that people use to reduce the amount of information they must 
consider when coming to a decision. 80 To investigate whether
franchisees suffered from cognitive biases when entering franchise
agreements, several common biases were tested via survey questions 
to the respondents. These biases include, but are not limited to,
anchoring, 81 the bandwagon effect, 82 confirmation bias, 83 and 
escalation of commitment.84
A. Anchoring Bias
                                                
78 See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124 (1974) (describing 
heuristics and biases in judgment). Tversky and Kahneman further explain the 
anchoring bias as occurring not only when the starting point—the particular 
number to hedge on—is given to the subject, but also when the subject bases his 
estimate on the result of some “incomplete computation.” Id. at 1128. The authors 
explain the meaning of the term “incomplete computation” by giving a 
mathematics example of an ascending and descending order of multiplying the first
eight real whole numbers. Id. The median estimate for the ascending sequence was 
512, while the median estimate for the descending sequence was 2,250. Id. The 
correct answer is 40,320. Id. So there is plausible evidence that making estimates 
by starting from an initial value that is adjusted to yield the final answer, as was 
shown by Tversky and Kahneman’s experiment, can have an effect as to what you 
would predict numerically.
79 Heuristic, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2018), https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/heuristic (“involving or serving as an aid to learning, 
discovery, or problem-solving by experimental and especially trial-and-error 
methods”).
80 See Charles R. Schwenk, Information, Cognitive Biases, and Commitment to a 
Course of Action, 11 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 298–310 (1986).
81 See Lebowitz & Baer, supra note 26.
82 See Lebowitz & Baer, supra note 26.
83 See Nickerson, supra note 77, at 175.
84 See WEBFINANCING, INC., supra note 29; see also Schwenk, supra note 80, at 
304.
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Before the survey was distributed to the randomly populated 
sample, the authors hypothesized that a majority of franchisees would 
answer “Yes” to relying on a particular piece of information and that,
when asked to explain what this information was, the franchisees 
would respond that it was numerical information. For example, we, as 
authors of this article and draftsmen of the franchisee survey in the 
appendix, expected most franchisee respondents to rely on their review 
of the financial figures listed in the Franchise Disclosure Document 
(FDD), previously known as the Uniform Franchise Offering Circular 
(UFOC). The FDD contains twenty-three sections 85 that contain 
valuable information for the prospective franchisee, such as franchise 
bankruptcy history as well as start-up and initial investment costs.86
These are among the first pieces of information that a franchise 
applicant will review when making his or her decision, and this initial 
exposure is precisely why franchisees may be susceptible to the 
anchoring bias. That bias affects a person’s ability to assess rationally 
an “initial starting value”;87 in other words, this person may expect his 
or her initial return on investment as a new franchisee to be higher than 
anticipated. A potential franchisee could also expect minimal start-up
costs because this aspiring franchisee anchors his or her assessment to 
a previously owned franchise. This could lead that person to become a
                                                
85 See John Buzza & Joseph B. Mosca, Create the Plan, Work the Plan: A Look at 
Why the Independent Business Owner Has Trouble Calling a Franchisee a True 
Entrepreneur, AMER. J. OF BUS. EDUC. 113 (2009). Buzza and Mosca detail the 
differences between an individual independently starting his or her own enterprise 
and a business model in which one can purchase an “already detailed and complete 
business plan.” They relate the popular belief that buying a franchise—the latter—
is an easier route to becoming an entrepreneur than if a person were to create a 
business from scratch (i.e., on his or her own).
86 16 C.F.R. § 436.5 (2007). 
87 See generally Markku Kaustia, Eeva Alho & Vesa Puttonen, How Much Does 
Expertise Reduce Behavioral Biases? The Case of Anchoring Effects in Stock 
Return Estimates, 37 FIN. MGMT. 391 (2008). The Tversky and Kahneman research 
study in 1974 (Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 78, at 1130) paved the way for 
numerous additional studies on the effects of anchoring in the valuation of real 
estate and the purchasing decisions of the consumer. The authors of this particular 
study explain that even experts can succumb to the anchoring bias. When put into 
the context of interpreting franchising agreements, it goes without saying that the 
franchisee, if he or she is burdened with anchoring bias, would most probably want 
an experienced franchise attorney to possess the knowledge and know-how in order 
to not fall into the cognitive bias traps that plague the franchisee. Because they are 
educated attorneys who specialize in a particular subset of business law, these 
lawyers should be able to navigate through and interpret the legalese on behalf of 
their clients; that additional expertise should serve to fend off any possible 
anchoring bias upon which the attorney, or expert, might rely.
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multi-unit franchisee, thereby part of an organizational arrangement in 
which franchisees are permitted to own and operate multiple units 
within the same franchise system.88
In addition, a would-be franchisee may anchor on the first bit of 
information and insufficiently adjust as the franchisor reveals less 
appealing information. 89 We can look to the FTC’s used-car rule 
(requiring the dealer to disclose all warranties in a buyer’s guide placed 
on the vehicle) or to the Truth in Lending Act (requiring that finance 
charges and interest rates be disclosed before credit is extended) as 
examples that ensure disclosure upfront in an effort to minimize the 
threat of anchoring bias.90 In the alternative, a potential franchisee 
could anchor “down” and make the unfortunate calculation not to buy 
a franchise when in reality the purchase would have been profitable. 
This would be the case if the initial anchor was to an arbitrary or 
irrational number, hence skewing the initial value, causing the 
prospective franchisee to anchor to a fatal misconception, and 
concluding in a lost investment opportunity.91
B. Reactance Bias
The authors hypothesized that a majority of franchisees would 
answer, “Yes,” to their having had friends or family members weigh 
in on the decision-making process and offer these–then prospective 
franchisees–before they committed to buying a franchise, an opposing 
view about whether to enter into the proposed franchise agreement. 
The cognitive bias studied through this particular question—
reactance—is characterized by people reacting against attempts to 
control their own behavior and thus to eliminate freedom of choice.92
                                                
88 See generally Marco Grunhagen & Robert A. Mittelstaedt, Entrepreneurs or 
Investors: Do Multi-Unit Franchisees Have Different Philosophical Orientations?,
43 J. SMALL BUS. MGMT. 207, 209 (2005). According to the article, multi-unit 
franchise ownership has “become the dominant form of franchising in the United 
States[.]” Similarly to our research, Grunhagen and Mittelstaedt’s article focuses on 
the franchisee’s viewpoint
89 Larry T. Garvin, Small Business and the False Dichotomies of Contract Law, 40 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 295, 325 (2005).
90 Id.
91 See Paul Bennett Marrow, Behavioral Decision Theory Can Offer New 
Dimension to Legal Analysis of Motivations, 74 N.Y. ST. B.J., Jul.–Aug. 2002, at 
46, 48. 
92 See Mona A. Clee & Robert A. Wicklund, Consumer Behavior and 
Psychological Reactance, 6 J. CONSUMER RES. 389 (1980). Similar to how the 
article uses a recent college graduate as an example of someone with job offers to 
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Potential franchisees consult many outside sources before arriving at 
the decision to own a franchise.93 These sources may include, but are 
not limited to, family, friends, attorneys, former business partners, and 
the Internet. Perhaps these friends or family members would strongly 
encourage a franchisee to play it safe and choose a powerful brand 
such as Subway or McDonald’s. They could support that decision by 
adding that those are established franchises with a well-known name 
and good reputation, and thus are more likely to draw customers than 
a relatively new or unknown franchise. 94 Indeed, many people 
become franchisees because they want to buy into a brand, something
already known and trusted by a large and growing customer base.95
Through a franchise, the hopeful franchisee believes that he or she will 
reap the benefits of brand recognition, without having to develop his 
or her own recognition through substantial effort and expense. It is this 
perceived value that gives the franchisor an upper hand in dictating the 
terms of the franchise. 96 These different influences could cause a 
                                                
ponder, a prospective franchisee may have numerous offers to balance in a given 
time from multiple franchisors in many jurisdictions. Just as a recent college 
graduate might find one job offer to be enticing and ready to accept it, a franchisee 
may select one offer in preference over the others, but then realize the loss of 
freedom that comes with making a definitive selection. This sense of a loss of 
freedom creates a delay in the selection process, and also makes otherwise turned-
down choices “suddenly more attractive,” in the words of the author. Id. This delay 
may also give the franchisee more time to implicitly succumb to multiple cognitive 
biases, as the selection process continues. With regard to the study of the 
“reactance theory.” Jack Brehm in 1966 and 1972 studied the theory (JACK W.
BREHM, A THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE (1966); JACK W. BREHM,
RESPONSES TO LOSS OF FREEDOM: A THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE 
(1972)) as well as Gisla Gniech and Hans-Joachim Grabitz in 1978 (Gisla Gniech 
& Hans-Joachim Grabitz, Freiheitseinengung und psychologische Reaktanz, in 
KOGNITIVE THEORIEN DER SOZIALPSYCHOLOGIE 48-74 (Dieter Frey ed., 1978)) and
Robert A. Wicklund in 1974 (ROBERT A. WICKLUND, FREEDOM AND REACTANCE 
(1974)) from both the laboratory and out in the field.
93 See, e.g., Franchisee Resources on the Web, AM. ASS’N OF FRANCHISEES &
DEALERS, (Aug. 5, 2018), https://www.aafd.org/buying-a-franchise/selecting-a-
franchise/franchise-resources/ (featuring list of outside sources relevant and 
available to franchisees).
94 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 11.
95 See Thomas J. Power, Fast Food Sweatshops: Franchisors as Employers under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act, 19 CUNY L. REV. 337, 354 (2016). 
96 Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Comput. Curriculum Corp., 614 A.2d 124, 151 (N.J. 
1992) (D’Annunzio, J.A.D., dissenting) (holding that the contractual relationship 
between a producer and its distributor was a “franchise” under the New Jersey 
Franchise Practices Act, and a community of interest existed under that Act to 
establish a franchise).
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budding franchisee to react to the viewpoints from family and friends
and make the incorrect decision. For instance, if the aspiring franchisee 
received from confidantes negative or opposing viewpoints about his 
or her probable decision to purchase a particular franchise, he or she 
might respond with hostility and prove even more likely to pursue the 
ownership of that franchise; this reaction would allow the future 
franchisee to maintain his or her autonomy.97
Certainly, autonomy is something the franchisee usually desires in 
the franchise relationship. Franchisee autonomy is described as the 
“degree of freedom fostered in the system with regards to franchisee 
entrepreneurial activity.”98 Prior research has shown that allowing 
franchisees to have flexibility and individualism in order to meet their 
local market needs may be beneficial to the franchise system. 99
However, franchisors may still seek to limit franchisee liberty by 
directing brand imaging and other quality controls. 100 Therefore,
managing a franchisee’s autonomy is a true balancing act for the 
franchisor.
C. Confirmation Bias
The survey questions for this article also tested for confirmation 
bias. The authors hypothesized that a majority of the franchisees
queried would believe that they had no better alternatives to the 
franchise that they currently operate. Thus, before buying their
franchises, most franchisees would have been so cognitively biased 
that they would not have considered other options or alternatives.
People fail to consider alternatives because they simply do not 
think to do so.101 In effect, they just look to confirm what they already 
believe to be true.102 For example, as the franchise applicants have 
some time to evaluate FDDs, they may fall victim to a reaffirmation of 
confirmation bias through the “mere-exposure effect,” a psychological 
phenomenon where people prefer things with which they are more 
                                                
97 See infra Appendix, Survey on Franchise Agreements, Question 6.
98 See Anna Watson, Olufunmilola (Lola) Dada, Marko Grunhagen & Melody L. 
Wollan, When Do Franchisors Select Entrepreneurial Franchisees? An 
Organizational Identity Perspective, 69 J. BUS. RES. 5934, 5936 (2016).
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 See Nickerson, supra note 77, at 200.
102 See Bill Kanasky, Jr., Juror Confirmation Bias, 33 NO.2 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 35
(2014) (“People tend to interpret new information in a way that confirms their 
existing beliefs.”). 
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familiar.103 Studies show that exposure to a stimuli increases one’s
mindset towards the stimuli.104 A franchisee who has more time to 
review a disclosure document will have more exposure to that
document. Thus, that potential franchisee, if already leaning toward, 
or even anxious to enter, a franchise relationship, perhaps due to 
cognitive biases such as confirmation bias or reactance bias,105 would 
tend to have an even more positive attitude toward purchasing the 
franchise. 
D. Information Bias
Lastly, the authors theorized that a majority of franchisees actually 
seek more information than necessary about their franchise agreement
before deciding to acquire a franchise. The cognitive bias being tested 
in this case is “information bias,” the tendency to seek information 
regardless of how ineffective such additional information is likely to 
be.106 “Additional information may be irrelevant or unnecessary.”107
Nonetheless, a person may be reluctant to make a decision if he or she 
thinks that some small piece of undiscoverable information is 
missing.108
When a leader or organization is faced with a difficult decision, 
that leader or organization typically does not want an information gap 
and will seek any information that may be missing.109 Even though a 
poorly performing franchise owner may be dismayed over his or her 
business situation, there is likely little help that additional information 
can offer at that point (after the franchise relationship commenced) 
because of the binding franchise agreement that this franchisee 
signed.110 The reason to understand and counter the information bias 
must be to prevent serious mistakes in judgment before it is too late, 
while a potential franchisee is still deciding for or against investment 
in and operation of a franchise.
                                                
103 Gillian Fournier, Mere Exposure Effect, PSYCHCENTRAL (July 17, 2016),
https://psychcentral.com/encyclopedia /mere-exposure-effect/.
104 Robert B. Zajonc, Attitudinal Effects of Mere Exposure, 9 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 23 (1968).
105 Supra notes 97, 101–104 and accompanying text. 
106 MICHAEL VAUGHAN, THE THINKING EFFECT: RETHINKING THINKING TO 
CREATE GREAT LEADERS AND THE NEW VALUE WORKER 25 (2013). 
107 See Kane, supra note 36, at 24.
108 Id. at 24–25.
109 Id. at 24.
110 In effect, the information at that point in time may be viewed as irrelevant. The 
franchisee would remain bound to the franchise agreement.           
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IV. COLLECTION OF SURVEY DATA
The authors developed a short survey to test whether or not 
franchisees experienced certain cognitive biases before they reached 
an agreement with their franchisor. 111 The authors obtained a
randomly populated sample of business franchisees, with over 200 
franchisees responding to and completing the survey. Once consent 
was given, Question 1 asked respondents if they had ever hired a 
franchise expert/attorney to assist them with their decision to operate 
a franchise. Nearly three-fourths of the respondents (70%) answered 
“No,” with 30% indicating that they had hired an expert/attorney.112
Question 2 asked respondents if they relied on a particular piece of 
information before entering into the franchise agreement, and, if so, to 
specify it.113 The percentage difference between the answers for this 
question was less pronounced, with 52% (105/201) of respondents 
indicating “No” and 48% (96/201) of respondents answering “Yes.”114
Moreover, ninety-three respondents described the “particular piece of 
information” that they relied on when making their decision. Out of 
those respondents who described their influencing information,
roughly 35% (33/93) of these respondents indicated that they relied 
upon the FDD or UFOC,115 while the other 65% (60/93) indicated that 
they had “previous experience” or “had already worked in a franchise”
in their general comments.116
The third question asked: “Before acquiring your present 
franchise, did you own and/or operate one or more franchises?”117
This question turned out to be a proper follow-up from the previous 
question, as only 7% of respondents owned and/or operated one or 
more franchises before taking on their current one. 118 It can be 
                                                
111 See generally infra Appendix, Survey on Franchise Agreements. 
112 Infra Appendix, Survey on Franchise Agreements, Question 1.
113 Infra Appendix, Survey on Franchise Agreements, Question 2.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Infra Appendix, Survey on Franchise Agreements (comments on file with the 
authors); The Uniform Franchise Offering Circular (UFOC) is a document that 
describes franchise opportunities, something akin to the Franchise Disclosure 
Document (FDD) that tended to replace it under the amended FTC Rule of 2007. 
Patricia Schaefer, Layman’s Guide to the Uniform Franchise Offering Circular,
FRANCHISE KNOW HOW, http://www.franchiseknowhow.com/articles/ufoc.htm (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2018).
117 Infra Appendix, Survey on Franchise Agreements, Question 3.
118 Id. 
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concluded from this question’s responses that franchisees rarely have 
prior experience with operating a franchise, and that their current 
franchise was the first one that they had owned and operated.119
The next two questions asked: “If you answered ‘Yes’ to the 
previous question - that, before acquiring your present franchise you 
owned and/or operated one or more franchises . . . was the previous 
franchise in the same field as your current franchise [Question 4] and 
would you consider that previous franchise successful? [Question 
5]” 120 With only 28 respondents, the results are not statistically 
significant. 121 However, over 70% of these respondents answered 
“No,” that their previous franchises were not in the same field as their 
current franchise, which could indicate that franchisees tend to 
diversify their portfolio when it comes to owning and operating 
franchises. This result goes against our initial hypothesis, as we 
originally hypothesized that franchisees would be so cognitively 
biased as to not consider (or buy into) franchises in alternative markets.
However, more respondents would have to participate in answering 
this specific question in order to assess the gravity of owning and 
operating multiple franchises. Finally, note that there may be a reduced 
number of “repeat” franchisees (those in the same field) because of 
non-competition or non-solicitation agreements restricting persons 
who left the employment of, or franchise relationship with, a franchise 
company in the same industry as the new franchised business; the 
prospective franchisee may be bound to such non-compete or non-
solicitation covenants with the former franchisor and thus impeded 
from signing a new contract that exposes the franchisee, and even its 
new franchisor, to potential liability.122
Over 78% of respondents to Question 5 believed that their previous 
franchise was successful. 123 A “successful” franchise may be
considered one that is well established, has “integrity,” and has 
                                                
119 Clearly, only a very small portion of the respondents who indicated that they 
had “previous experience” or “had already worked in a franchise,” infra Appendix,
Survey on Franchise Agreements, Question 2, actually had owned or operated a 
franchise. Infra Appendix, Survey on Franchise Agreements, Question 3. 
120 Infra Appendix, Survey on Franchise Agreements, Question 4.
121 Id. (Note that with only 28 respondents—the results for this question are not 
enough to be statistically significant).
122 Henry C. Su & Michael J. Lockerby, Trade Secrets, in THE INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY HANDBOOK: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR FRANCHISE, BUSINESS, AND IP
COUNSEL, supra note 48, at 213, 242–44.
123 Infra Appendix, Survey on Franchise Agreements, Question 5. Again, as for 
Survey Question 4, the numbers are too small to be statistically significant.
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franchisees happy with the overall setup.124 In franchising, past results 
are an excellent indicator of future performance.125 Decisions such as 
picking a product one cares about, making sure to adequately research 
the business, and thinking twice before determining a location for a 
franchise126 are all notable actions leading to franchise success. Those 
respondents who deemed their first franchise a success may also be 
predisposed to think that their next venture will also, almost 
automatically, triumph. Such conviction may be the result of 
psychological mechanisms where individuals employ the 
overconfidence effect, a form of cognitive bias fostered by a personal
                                                
124 See Michael Garlick, The Franchise Relationship: Counseling Potential 
Franchisors and Franchisees, in THE FLA. BAR: FRANCHISE LAW AND PRACTICE 3-
1(THE FLA. BAR,1996).
125 See Grant Amos, Gleaning Psychometric-Based Insights for Franchise Success,
FRANCHISE CHAT (last visited Dec. 20, 2018), http://www.franchise-
chat.com/resources/gleaning_psychometric-
based_insights_for_franchise_success.htm.
126 How to Succeed as a Franchisee, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 11, 2008, 5:33 PM),
http://guides.wsj.com/small-business/franchising/how-to-succeed-as-a-franchisee/.
(in addition to the franchises that do succeed, there also those that inevitably fail 
every year from causes including but not limited to: lack of funding, poor 
relationships with others and management, and a mismatch between the business 
operation and the franchisee. Not only is the decision to hire a franchise attorney a 
decision that the franchisee must make early on in the decision-making process, but 
also hiring a consultant who can give advice to the franchisee about whether the 
product that he or she will be selling is a “good fit” opportunity is also a hiring 
decision that the franchisee should and must make. From reading this article, there 
is a noticeable plethora of mistakes that a franchisee can make from the get-go. If 
the franchisees do not have adequate managerial experience themselves, they may 
employ poor managers, which may lead to the other causes of why certain 
franchises fail, as stated above. The anchoring bias, mentioned above, can take hold 
if the franchisee possesses insufficient funds to keep the business afloat. For 
instance, as stated in this article, the initial up-front fee to own and operate a 
franchise must be paid to the franchisor and is “clearly stated.” However, beginner 
franchisees may place too much weight on the initial fee without equally 
considering the impact of high operating costs. Alternatively, unanticipated events 
can also bring the franchise into financial ruin. By relying on the initial fee amount 
as a barometer for assessing whether or not a good deal is being offered by the 
franchisor, the franchisee can lead him or herself down a dangerous path of not 
keeping cognizant the additional costs of overhead that come with running a 
business. The article also brings up the importance of realizing the detriment that 
“unrealistic optimism” can bring. Optimism bias is a cognitive bias that can plague 
franchisees. For instance, if a franchisee is not adequately prepared financially to 
withstand a financial crisis because the franchisee did not decide to save during a 
period of economic boom and thought that the favorable business conditions were 
bound to last a long time, then the franchisee falls into the pit of the optimism bias).
2019] BOUND BY BIAS? 25
history absent of any negative stimuli.127 That is, during his or her past 
franchisee establishment, the individual may not have experienced 
negative consequences; however, the individual may also be unaware 
of the potential for a good franchise opportunity and thus have a 
negative impression of the franchise system if the one that he or she
chose first performs poorly. Without negative stimuli or awareness 
regarding the true meaning, if any, of positive stimuli, an individual 
may develop a false sense that he or she is able to produce an optimal 
outcome sans the assistance of legal counsel. 
Question 6 asked, “Before entering into a single franchise 
agreement, did you have friends or family that offered an opposing 
view as to whether you should enter into the agreement?”128 Over 
71% of the respondents answered “No,” with the rest receiving an 
opposing view from friends or family about their impending franchise 
purchase.129 The authors designed this question to test whether or not 
the use of advice or suggestions swayed franchisees to go against the 
mass, general opinion of family members or friends. Thus, this 
question tested the aforementioned reactance bias. 130 Receiving 
advice about “real world problems”131 is processed differently than 
answers to “textbook problems,” and the decision whether to become 
a franchisee is surely not a singular textbook problem. People expect 
advice to help them. However, there is evidence throughout decision-
making studies to show that individuals may draw different 
conclusions when presented with the same information. 132 This 
phenomenon is called the “framing effect.”133
For question 7, over 53% of respondents answered that they had 
held alternatives besides the franchise that they currently operated—
the answers are examined in detail in the “Analysis” section below.134
Many of the franchisees who responded owned businesses in fields 
                                                
127 See Joyce Ehrlinger, Ainsley L. Mitchum & Carol S. Dweck, Understanding 
Overconfidence: Theories of Intelligence, Preferential Attention, and Distorted 
Self-Assessment, 63 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 94, 97–99 (2016).
128 Infra Appendix, Survey on Franchise Agreements, Question 6.
129 Id.
130 See Clee & Wicklund, supra note 92, at 389–90 and accompanying text.
131 Ilan Yaniv, Receiving Other People's Advice: Influence and Benefit. 93 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1, 1 (2004).
132 Shlomi Sher & Craig R.M. McKenzie, Framing Effects, UC SAN DIEGO-
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY,
http://psy2.ucsd.edu/~mckenzie/SHERMCKENZIEFRAMINGEFFECTSFINAL1.
pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2018).
133 Id.
134 Infra Appendix, Survey on Franchise Agreements, Question 7.
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such as early childhood education, landscaping, and food service,135
an eclectic group, to say the least.
Three distinct stages exist in the consumer decision-making 
process.136 The first two stages are retrieval of information and the 
formation of a consideration set, respectively.137 The third and final 
stage of this process, most important to our discussion, involves the 
evaluation of an assortment of products, or, in this special case of 
franchising, a selection from a set of different franchises 138 . The 
would-be franchisee is the consumer in this case, and he or she must 
come to a decision about what franchise to buy. The question here is: 
Do prospective franchisees consider alternatives before they sign their 
single-franchise agreement? Or, by contrast, do franchisees simply 
pinpoint a selection and the process is complete? 
Research shows that having too many choices can lead people to 
take “less positive risks.”139 These findings can have a profound effect 
on the application of cognitive psychology to business agreements and 
eventual ownership. In Doing Better but Feeling Worse: The Paradox 
of Choice, Barry Schwartz and Andrew Ward describe choice as 
                                                
135 Id. (comments on file with authors).
136 Rajdeep Grewal, Thomas W. Cline & Anthony Davies, Early-Entrant 
Advantage, Word-of-Mouth Communication, Brand Similarity, and the Consumer 
Decision-Making Process, 13 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 187, 188 (2003). According 
to the authors, word-of-mouth “significantly influences product evaluations and 
purchase decisions.” Id. Many of our collected free responses for the survey 
included the answer “word of mouth” when the franchisees were asked to further 
explain any answer choices to the previous seven questions or to write a comment 
to be left. The franchisee may also rely upon word-of-mouth if he or she elected to 
receive advice from family members or friends about whether or not to take on the 
ownership of a franchise. Regardless, word-of-mouth communication is described 
by Grewal, Cline, and Davies as a “personal, unpaid means of communication” 
which enhances credibility. Id. at 196. Considering the role of a prospective 
franchisee, the franchisee may give more cognitive recall effort towards word of 
mouth conversations between him or herself and the franchisor, rather than through 
more modern forms of communication such as text messaging and email). 
137 Id.
138 Id. 
139 Tori DeAngelis, Too Many Choices?, MONITOR ON PSYCHOL., June 2004, at 
56, (noting that having so many choices to choose from in a given selection 
situation can overwhelm us and our typical thinking process, sometimes to the 
point where we “choose nothing at all.”). In our survey, question 7, asked the 
franchisees whether or not they had alternatives to the franchise that they ultimately 
chose to own and operate, and slight majority (53%) stated that they had to decide 
from multiple choices. Some of their brief explanations as to why they chose to 
make the agreement with their franchisor give insight into the thought process and 
whether or not it may have been influenced by cognitively biases).
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something that can lead to “misery-inducing tyranny.” 140 For 
instance, one respondent offered his opinion as to whether he had 
alternatives besides the franchise he currently operates; he wrote that 
there were “too many to list” when offered by a franchise broker,141
and presumably the resulting information overload was a detriment. 
The recurring theme of having to choose between alternatives is often 
at the heart of “buyer’s remorse.” The sense of regret that one feels 
when one has made a purchase or ownership decision, but then has 
“second thoughts” about the transaction, is apparent in the behavior of 
those making commonplace purchasing decisions,142 and it is found 
to occur in franchisees’ choice to buy a franchise.143
Many franchisees, however, commented only positively about 
their selection of the franchise they currently owned and operated. In 
contrast to the aforementioned “choices” paradox, a number of 
franchisees seemed to thrive from, and therefore enjoy the decision-
making process of choosing a particular franchise. One franchisee 
mentioned “values” matching his own as a reason why he chose his 
franchise, with another believing that it “best fit [his] goals and skill 
base.” 144 The effect of any significant cognitive biases on these 
apparently contented franchisees appears to be negligible based on the 
percentage of respondents who had alternatives as well as their 
recorded opinions. The final “Yes/No” question of the survey asked: 
“After entering into your franchise agreement, did you find yourself 
seeking out more information about your agreement?” Over one-third 
(35%) of respondents answered that they did seek out more 
information, while 65% of respondents indicated “No.”145
V. ANALYSIS
A. Economic and Demographic Considerations
                                                
140 Barry Schwartz & Andrew Ward, Doing Better but Feeling Worse: The 
Paradox of Choice, in POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY IN PRACTICE 86 (P.A. Linley and S. 
Joseph eds., 2004). 
141 Infra Appendix, Survey on Franchise Agreements, Question 7.
142 Schwartz & Ward, supra note 140, at 86–87.
143 A fair number of respondent franchisees, from around the United States –
nearly 10% of the total respondents – took the additional time in answering the 
survey to discuss their second thoughts in the comments section of the survey. 
Infra Appendix, Survey on Franchise Agreements, Question 9.
144 Id.
145 Infra Appendix, Survey on Franchise Agreements, Question 8.
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The survey results reveal some important data. Most franchisees 
(almost three-fourths) chose not to hire a franchise expert or attorney 
to assist them in their decision-making about owning a franchise.146
Cost, among other deterring factors, must have had a significant
impact on a franchisee’s thinking.147 With additional setup expenses,
the cost of hiring a franchise expert or attorney may prove to be too 
large a financial outlay for the prospective franchisee.148 Additionally, 
most members of the public perceive franchise agreements as non-
negotiable, so many aspiring franchisees think help from an attorney 
would be futile.149 It is reasonable to assume that franchisees, in an 
effort to cut costs, would turn to the Internet to answer their legal and 
business questions rather than hiring an expert or attorney. 150
Furthermore, as the percentage of franchisees who are minorities has 
risen, so has the possible increase in unrepresented franchisees. 
Generally, minorities (Hispanics, African-Americans, Asians, and 
Pacific Islanders) are more likely to be wary of hiring attorneys or 
experts outside of family or those directly recommended by a family 
member.151
Indeed, franchising has long featured a growing number of 
minorities and women; the days of franchisees being almost 
exclusively white males is long gone.152 Franchisees that identify as 
                                                
146 Id. at Question 1. 
147 See Internicola, supra note 12; Murphy, supra note 68.
148 Jeff Elgin, Is the Price Right?, ENTREPRENEUR (Aug. 14, 2006), 
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/164820 (describing various initial costs in a 
franchise setup); Murphy, supra note 68 (describing the average costs of a 
franchise attorney). 
149 Emerson, supra note 38, at 720–21.
150 The Internet is erupting with websites that provide “immediate legal advice.” 
Companies such as LegalZoom, Just Answer Legal, and Public Legal all provide 
services to individuals interested in getting answers without consulting a lawyer in 
person. This is also not including the legal information blogs that law firms provide 
on their own websites. The results speak for themselves. Robert Ambrogi, Latest 
Legal Victory has LegalZoom Poised for Growth, AM. B.J. (Aug. 2014),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/latest_legal_victory_has_legalzoom_p
oised_for_growth/ (noting that Legal Zoom earned $156 million in 2011).
151 There is data in another field of law indicating the tendency to not hire lawyers. 
A study of 2,438 bankruptcy filings in 2007 indicated that the odds of non-
Hispanic African American debtors using lawyers were about 43 percent less than 
the odds for white debtors. Angela Littwin, The Do-It-Yourself Mirage: Complexity 
in the Bankruptcy System, in BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS 
(Katherine Porter ed., 2012).
152 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, FRANCHISED BUSINESS OWNERSHIP : BY
MINORITY AND GENDER GROUPS: AN UPDATE FOR THE IFA FOUNDATION 2 (2018), 
https://www.franchise.org/sites/default/files/Franchise%20Business%20Ownership
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minorities operate franchises in greater rates compared to those that do
not.153 Although the number of franchisees from underrepresented 
groups is far from a majority, the rapid increase in minority ownership 
rate coupled with almost three out of every four franchisees not hiring 
an attorney to assist them with their legal needs is a startling 
correlation.154
To start, financing is the main problem that minority franchise 
owners face. 155 Often, minority franchisees do not know how to 
                                                
%202018_0.pdf (“Overall, the minority ownership rate for franchised businesses 
increased by 10.3 percentage points from 20.5 percent in 2007 to 30.8 percent in 
2012, an increase in the ownership rate of 50 percent,” while for non-franchised, 
non-franchised businesses the figures were, in order, much lower - an increase of 
4.6 percentage points, from 14.2% to 18.8%, for a 32 percent rise in the ownership 
rate); Id. (“female ownership among franchises increased by 10.1 percentage points 
from 20.5 percent in 2007 to 30.6 percent in 2012, an increase of 49 percent”); Id.
(the overall percentages for minority-owned franchised businesses and for female 
owned franchised businesses also rose from 2002 to 2007).
153 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, FRANCHISED BUSINESS OWNERSHIP: BY
MINORITY AND GENDER GROUPS 7 (2007),
http://www.franchise.org/sites/default/files/ek-pdfs/featured_news/women-and-
minorities-in-franchising-rept.final_0.pdf; In that same year, almost twenty percent 
of all franchised businesses were owned by minorities. Id. at 4; That percentage has 
continued to rise since. Littwin, supra note 151. 
154 Our research did not test the impact that race or gender may have had in 
whether or not franchisees were found to have been susceptible to certain cognitive 
biases. That remains a topic for future studies. However, while causation is unclear, 
there does seem to be a positive correlation between minority status and proceeding 
to a franchise closing sans counsel.
155 Rachel McCormick-Jennings, Fast Food Franchise Track: Minority 
Entrepreneurs Find Opportunity in Brand Names, MILWAUKEE BUS. J. (Jan. 29, 
2006), 
https://www.bizjournals.com/milwaukee/stories/2006/01/30/story7.html?sprint. 
Most restaurant chains mandate that potential owners have a “minimum net worth 
and liquid assets.” Id. This factor alone can lead to the purging of many would-be 
franchisees from the competition pool of potential owners, especially minorities 
without extensive business connections. As a result, many prospective franchisees 
may find themselves focusing in on just one factor upon many when deciding 
whether or not to make the purchase—the startup cost, rather than the softer but 
also important factors such as management style, technology available, and 
location. This can implicitly lead to the franchisee seeking confirmation for what 
he or she may already know the answer—that the price of owning a franchise may 
be too high and the future cost of having to obtain a loan may in itself be 
unfeasible. The article cites Henry James, a business counselor at the Small 
Business Development Center at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee as saying 
that “the owner usually has to come up with 35 to 40 percent of the money.” Once 
the owner comes up with the money, there may be an escalation of commitment on 
the part of the franchisee to continue making either investments into the franchise 
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obtain the financial resources necessary to start a business.
Additionally, lack of social and business connections156 puts minority 
franchisees at an even further disadvantage. In order to help alleviate 
the disparities that exist between privileged and underprivileged 
franchisees, many of America’s most well-known franchises, such as 
Burger King, Six Continents Hotels, and Subway, have collaborated 
to create “minority outreach programs” 157 in franchising. For 
example, Subway started a “Minority Ownership Financial Assistance 
Program” that allows minority franchisees to receive financing of up 
to 90% of the franchise fee, with the first six months interest free.158
Choice Hotels also developed a free seminar targeting minority 
entrepreneurs in order to attract more minorities to its franchising 
base.159 Through these minority outreach programs, franchisees may 
be less inclined to desire the services of a franchise attorney, especially 
when the franchisors offer free seminars. 160 With topics such as 
evaluating hotel opportunities, capital and operating costs, and sources 
of capital and funding,161 franchisees may be deluded into thinking
that the specified topics are the only information they need in order to 
begin their new venture as a franchise owner.
Although franchisors have implemented minority outreach 
programs, 162 what they have accomplished sometimes remains 
unclear. The previously listed franchises with minority outreach 
programs are some of the world’s most profitable franchises with the 
resources necessary to establish an active presence in poorer 
communities. Most franchises are not as costly to join, nor as lucrative,
and some are owned by franchisors who “[get] greedy,” according to 
                                                
opportunity or to continue running the operation past the point where the venture 
may even be profitable, perhaps even going against the advice of seasoned 
professionals or possibly family members who offer a different outlook.
156 See Carla Wong McMillian & Kelly J Baker, Discrimination Claims and 
Diversity Initiatives: What’s a Franchisor to Do?, 28 FRANCHISE L.J. 71, 71–72
(2008).
157 RICHARD WILLARD, INT’L FRANCHISING ASS’N EDUC. FOUND., MINORITY 




158 Id. at 14.
159 Id. at 7.
160 Press Release, Choice Hotels Int’l Inc., Choice Hotels Expands Franchise 
Ownership Among Minorities, http://media.choicehotels.com/2006-04-03-Choice-
Hotels-Expands-Franchise-Ownership-Among-Minorities. 
161 WILLARD, supra note 157, at 7.
162 Id.
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one anonymous respondent from the survey. 163 For these owners, 
expanding outreach is a futile concept where money can be allocated 
elsewhere.
Additionally, sometimes it is the franchisees themselves who wish 
to expand into different markets. In Home Repair, Inc. v. Paul W. 
Davis Systems, Inc., 164 an African-American franchisee sued his 
franchisor over restricting minority opportunities in select 
communities.165 This particular franchisee had been in good-standing 
and wanted to expand his business into “white areas” in metropolitan 
Chicago.166 The franchisor ended up denying the African-American 
franchisee’s proposal and encouraged him to expand only in minority-
populated inner-cities.167 The District Court upheld the franchisee’s
pursuit of a claim of racial discrimination, and–while the case
eventually settled before the start of the trial–the result demonstrates 
possible ramifications for franchisors that actively avoid outreach or 
limit it to urban areas and poorer markets.168
In Home Repair, the franchisee was able to obtain access to an 
attorney who successfully advocated on the franchisee’s behalf. 169
But timing is often crucial, and would-be franchisees that do seek legal 
assistance often do not solicit lawyers until well after the beginning of 
the franchising process. 170 This can be seen in many of the 
                                                
163 Infra Appendix, Survey on Franchise Agreements, Question 9 (comments on 
file with authors).
164 Home Repair, Inc. v. Paul W. Davis Systems, Inc., 98 C 4074, 1998 U.S. DIST. 
LEXIS 16223, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 8, 1998) (mentioning the plaintiff’s counsel in 
introduction). 
165 See Carmen Caruso, Racial Discrimination in Franchising, FRANCHISE TIMES,
June 2001, edited version available at https://cdcaruso.com/articles/racial-
discrimination-in-franchising.
166 Home Repair, Inc., 98 C 4074, 1998 U.S. DIST. LEXIS 16223, at 2.
167 Id.
168 See Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Selection and Retention: Discrimination 
Claims and Affirmative Action Programs, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 511 (1998) (discussing 
numerous claims of racial discrimination brought by franchisees or franchise 
candidates against a franchisor).
169 Home Repair, Inc., 98 C 4074, 1998 U.S. DIST. LEXIS 16223, at 1.
170 Lawyers, though, can play a crucial role on behalf of their clients later in the 
franchising process. Throughout the business life of a franchisee, attorneys may be 
sought and retained, and—even later—their representation may be crucial to a 
franchisee’s success. This was demonstrated in Home Repair, 1998 U.S. DIST. 
LEXIS 162323. It clearly is a necessity in contests over the end stage of a 
franchise, termination. See Emerson, supra note 61. 
OHIO STATE BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:132
franchisees’ survey responses.171 While seven out of ten franchisees
failed to hire a franchise attorney, the work handled on behalf of the
thirty percent that did retain an attorney was significant. One 
franchisee weighed in on his attorney’s role as ensuring that the 
franchisee “was covered and didn’t get screwed if [the franchisee]
defaulted or the franchisor didn’t live up to the contract.”172 Another 
franchisee had an attorney who “raised concerns about the level of 
support stated in the preliminary packet and what was actually listed 
in the contract.”173 By ensuring that their clients are protected, and by 
raising concerns about the various contractual terms in the agreement, 
franchise lawyers can provide a competitive advantage in decision-
making to their clients that unrepresented franchisees are unable to 
accomplish on their own.
B. Biases Reflected in the Survey Results
Almost half (48%) of franchisees relied upon a distinct piece of 
information when arriving at their decision to become a franchisee.174
When asked to describe the “particular piece of information” upon 
which they relied, 35% stated that they relied upon the FDD or the 
UFOC.175 Past experiences (whether the franchisee had already dealt 
with the franchisor before, relied on the franchisor’s past experience 
of success, or had some prior relationship with the franchisor before 
arriving at an agreement) played a significant role in how respondents 
answered, as well as word-of-mouth and financial figures.176
The last question of the survey encouraged franchisees to write 
freely about their current experience as a franchisee. 177 Although 
some respondents volunteered that they “haven’t had any reasons to 
re-visit the agreement,”178 others felt quite differently. For example, a 
number of franchisees believed that some terms in the agreement were 
                                                
171 Infra Appendix, Survey on Franchise Agreements (comments on file with 
authors).
172 Infra Appendix, Survey on Franchise Agreements, Question 9 (comments on 
file with authors).
173 Id.
174 Infra Appendix, Survey on Franchise Agreements, Question 2 (FDD/UFOC stat 
table).
175 Id.
176 Infra Appendix, Survey on Franchise Agreements, Question 2 (FDD/UFOC stat 
table) (comments on file with authors).
177 Infra Appendix, Survey on Franchise Agreements, Question 9 (comments on 
file with authors).
178 Id.
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“confusing” and “weren’t explained as clear [sic] as they now needed 
to be.”179 A survey respondent from Kansas detailed his experience as 
a franchisee in interesting terms. When the respondent first entered 
into his franchise agreement, he was – the respondent admitted – “very 
uninformed.” 180 In the very next sentence, the Kansas franchisee 
stated that he “wishes [he] had done more research prior to entering 
into the agreement.” 181 Perhaps this manifests the psychological 
phenomenon known as “hindsight bias,” defined as “the tendency for 
people considering a past event to overestimate [his or her] likelihood 
of having predicted its occurrence.”182 In this case, the respondent 
believed that conducting more research on the franchise agreement 
would have meant that he avoided feeling “uninformed” about 
becoming a franchisee. This franchisee admitted to “not seeking out”
alternatives because the franchise that he chose “really appealed to 
[him] initially” (and, obviously, not as much in retrospect).183
The respondent fell victim to confirmation bias by succumbing to 
useless information184 and by failing to pursue alternatives that could 
have improved his fortunes as a franchisee. Confirmation bias was also 
evident for another franchisee, who believed her agreement to be 
“extensive . . . too hard to absorb all at once,” and therefore something 
she “used . . . as a reference at times.” 185 This franchisee likely 
referenced her franchise agreement to see whether it actually contained 
what she already thought was there, 186 thus demonstrating the




182 See Hal R. Arkes, et al., Eliminating the Hindsight Bias, 73 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 305, 305 (1988). With regard to hindsight bias being tested within our 
research study, there was a small total of 27 collected responses, and even though 
21 of those franchisees answered affirmatively to the question of whether they had 
thought of their previous franchise as “successful,” a lack of evidence exists as to 
whether the franchise truly was a success and thus merited the franchisee believing 
it to be a success, or whether the franchise was not successful and the franchisee 
fell victim to a hindsight/recall bias; see infra Appendix, Survey on Franchise 
Agreements, Question 5.
183 Infra Appendix, Survey on Franchise Agreements, Question 9 (comments on 
file with authors).
184 See Nickerson, supra note 77, at 175.
185 Infra Appendix, Survey on Franchise Agreements, Question 9 (comments on 
file with authors).
186 See Ben Yagoda, Your Lying Mind: The Cognitive Biases Tricking Your Brain,
THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 2018, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/09/cognitive-bias/565775/ 
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confirmation bias. Those who do seek information to “confirm” 
preexisting beliefs or to reaffirm a position as a franchisee are subject 
to information bias, such as the case of one franchisee who even after 
owning [his] own business, chose to “[seek] out more information 
regarding his agreement” after the fact.187 His reasoning would be that 
he intended “[t]o understand how conflicts [he saw] in the Franchisee 
and Franchisor relationship might be addressed.”188 Information bias 
affects other business affairs as well. For instance, research shows that 
providing information about a public or private good “can be viewed 
as a persuasive communication likely to change . . . attitudes and 
intentions” towards that good.189
C. Buyer’s Remorse
Even if a franchisee were to seek out additional information, as 
was the case for the 35% of respondents who admitted to doing so after 
signing their franchise agreements,190 would the franchisee be able to 
use effectively the mostly innocuous or redundant information? “Keep 
in mind almost 100% of franchise agreements favor the franchisor,” 
wrote one West Coast franchisee.191 Recall that nearly three-fourths 
of respondents did not hire a franchise attorney192 to review the often-
complex language of a long legal document that includes clauses and 
statements referring to territories, royalties, arbitration, and 
disclaimers. 193 This presence of legal jargon, combined with the 
absence of representation, only deepens the pitfall into which some 
                                                
(stating that confirmation bias—probably the most pervasive and damaging bias of 
them all—leads us to look for evidence that confirms what we already think).
187 Id. 
188 Id.
189 See Icek Ajzen, Thomas C. Brown & Lori H. Rosenthal, Information Bias in 
Contingent Valuation: Effects of Personal Relevance, Quality of Information, and 
Motivational Orientation, 30.1 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 43, 44 (1996).
190 Infra Appendix, Survey on Franchise Agreements, Question 8.
191 Infra Appendix, Survey on Franchise Agreements, Question 9 (comments on 
file with authors).
192 Infra Appendix, Survey on Franchise Agreements, Question 1.
193 Emerson, supra note 15, at 674.
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franchisees fall.194 In one case, a franchisee even felt that she “signed 
the agreement under duress.”195
Rather than associate her complaint with a specific cognitive bias, 
clearly the respondent felt that she could not thoroughly assess the 
information in a comprehensive manner, even mentioning that she 
took it on “blind faith . . . that nothing would change, when in fact 
everything did change.”196 This is a classic example of franchisees 
believing that the franchise agreement is non-negotiable, and therefore 
they choose to sign, believing that they have no say in the matter and 
must simply hope for the best. 197 This case demonstrates the 
franchisor’s disproportionately greater bargaining power. 198 This 
example also epitomizes a franchisee who was so cognitively biased 
(simply taking on faith rather than using reasoning and seeking 
effective counsel) to the point that she was unable to evaluate 
accurately what was needed to understand her franchise agreement, as 
she remained in thrall to “buyer’s remorse” or regrets of action.199
Buyer’s remorse abounds. One respondent from Illinois states, “in 
2007 when [he] first purchased, [he] was very happy with the 
agreement” but now the respondent feels that “the franchise owner has 
lost touch with his smaller franchises and has gotten greedy.”200 In
another instance, a franchisee from Missouri declares, in a stark 
denouncement of both its franchisor’s motives and its actions: “[S]ince
opening, [we] now question the business practices [of this particular 
franchise]” and “cannot recommend any of [the franchisor’s] 
concepts.”201 From “undisclosed fees,”202 to the “many unanticipated 
unintended consequences [that] occurred after the franchise 
                                                
194 Uri Benoliel & Xu Zheng, Are Disclosures Readable? An Empirical Test, 70
ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (an empirical study of 523 franchise disclosures 
indicating that, on average, a prospective franchisee needs over 20 years of 
education in order to understand, on the first reading, a FDD). 
195 Infra Appendix, Survey on Franchise Agreements, Question 9 (comments on 
file with authors).
196 Id.
197 Emerson, supra note 38, at 720–21 (discussing how this misconception helps to 
reinforce many franchisees’ predisposition to not hire a franchise attorney). 
198 Id. at 717 n.38.
199 See Emily Rosenzweig & Thomas Gilovich, Buyer’s Remorse or Missed 
Opportunity? Differential Regrets for Material and Experiential Purchases, 102 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 215, 216 (2012).
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purchase,”203 it is clear that buyer’s remorse affects many franchisees’
level of contentment with and commitment to their current business.
VI. POLICY RESPONSES
Evidence, including the surveys below, shows that numerous 
franchisees fall victim to many different cognitive biases. This raises 
the question: What can be done to mitigate the biases in franchising? 
How can governments act to reform the way in which franchisors and 
franchisees conduct business, yet still manage to leave both sides 
content? From a political standpoint, it is bound to be difficult. 
Franchisors increasingly have become involved in national political 
controversies, and franchisees in return have demanded some form of 
franchisor accountability. 204 Without franchisor accountability, 
prospective franchisees may be discouraged from investing in such a 
highly-charged setting,205 and will also thus forego the opportunity to 
be part of an entrepreneurial experience. Inasmuch as franchising 
creates a relationship of mutual dependence between the two parties, 
any proposed regulation that is “one-sided” 206 and ignores that 
interdependence ultimately fails to advance the needs of the individual 
businesses (franchisor or franchisee) or the franchise network 
overall.207
In the survey, we asked over 200 franchisees if they relied 
especially on a particular piece of information. Many stated that the 
FDD or UFOC was their primary piece of information.208 Listed later 
in the FDD/UFOC are the financials, and, also on point, where political 
contributions would be listed if the FTC Franchise Rule were to 
expand disclosure transparency for political spending on the 
                                                
203 Id.
204 See Daniel J. Oates, Franchisor Political Speech: The Disclosure Question, 34
FRANCHISE L.J. 555, 562 (2015). 
205 Robert W. Emerson & Jason R. Parnell, Franchise Hostages: Fast Food, God, 
and Politics, 29 J. L. & POL. 353, 384 (2014).
206 See Eric A. Zacks, Contract Review: Cognitive Bias, Moral Hazard, and 
Situational Pressure, 9 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 379, 413 (2015) 
(explaining that when an attorney has knowledge of her client’s superior bargaining 
power with respect to the desire to consummate the transaction, the drafting 
attorney can prepare a more one-sided contract than what might be possible or 
preferred if the parties were situated differently).
207 Byron E. Fox & Henry C. Su, Franchise Regulation - Solutions in Search of 
Problems?, 20 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 241, 302–3 (1995).
208 Infra Appendix, Survey on Franchise Agreements, Question 2 (comments on 
file with authors).
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franchisor’s part. 209 This would undoubtedly also lead to the 
imposition of requirements on franchisees and their associations if 
they, too, desire to lobby the government for more franchisee-friendly 
laws. If these laws are to help protect potential and existing franchisees 
– forcing more extensive and meaningful disclosures and creating 
substantive franchise law reforms (e.g., required franchise contract 
provisions and prohibited franchisor practices) – then these parties 
must recognize their inextricable link to the other side. For instance, a 
franchisee’s life ahead as possible agent of the franchisor may call for 
some upgraded franchise laws, but in this area any increased 
transparency requirements for the franchisor very likely must extend 
as well to the franchisees, their associations, and any other franchisee 
advocacy groups That would be a fair exchange to get fairer, more 
meaningful disclosures. 
Transparency and measures to confront, directly, the would-be 
franchisee’s cognitive biases are necessary. Besides both mandated 
disclosures prior to a franchise agreement and legislative or regulatory 
intervention governing franchise contracts as a substantive matter, 
other reforms may be implemented. We can use the thinking of the 
franchisee (his or her cognitive biases) to push him or her in the right
direction, through anchoring and nudging. American business and 
policymakers also can adopt a number of approaches from other 
nations, such as rescission, psychometric tests, and franchisor pilot 
units.  
A. State Franchisee Protection Laws
While new franchise legislation has been relatively rare, hope 
springs eternal for franchisee activists. Reform proposals themselves 
are common, and, of course, their enactment is always possible. 210
                                                
209 Oates, supra note 204, at 562.
210 There are many hurdles to clear before a bill gets to the governor’s desk, and 
still the bill may, unexpectedly, be waylaid. In California, for example, the 
legislature pushed through an amendment to the state’s Franchise Relations Act, 
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 20020–20021 (Deering 2007), with the legal 
standard for an acceptable franchise termination going from “good cause” to 
“substantial and material breach” of the franchise contract. Governor Edmund G. 
(Jerry) Brown, Jr. vetoed the bill on September 29, 2014. Finally, in late October 
2015, Brown signed a bill providing a different standard for termination: limiting 
good cause to instances when the franchisee failed to “substantially comply” with 
the franchise agreement even after being given 60 days’ notice and a period to cure 
his or her alleged breach. Emerson, supra note 61, at 143–44 & nn.156–61.
Indicative of how difficult it is to pass even a focused, limited franchise bill is that 
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This is doubtless spurred on by an aversion toward, and need to 
surmount, the states’ inability to create, let alone adhere to, a uniform 
model of interpreting franchise law and regulating franchise 
practices.211
As an example of recent state legislation, consider Wisconsin’s 
law. During the 2015-2016 Wisconsin Legislative Session, the Senate 
passed Senate Bill 422, the Franchise Protection Act. 212 Governor 
Scott Walker signed the Act on March 2, 2016, affirming that 
franchisors and franchisees were “separate entities.”213 Though this 
act was meant to halt “government overreach” over the lives of small-
business owners in response to recent changes the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) implemented and not so much to help the 
franchisee become a less cognitively-biased businessperson, it did 
show that franchisees were an area of concern for a state 
government.214 Similarly, Ohio’s 2013 business opportunity statute is 
an example of significant reform in how franchisees are treated.215
According to the Ohio State Bar Association website, the Business 
Opportunity Plan Law prohibits “misrepresentations,” requires 
“presale disclosures to the franchisee,” and, unlike the FTC Rule, 
allows for the franchisee to “sue for damages, attorney’s fees and other 
relief.”216 With some franchisees reporting inadequate explanations 
by franchisors or their agents,217and, more significantly, with several 
franchisees volunteering their belief that they had signed the franchise 
                                                
party politics played no significant part in the drafting, slowing down, vetoing, or 
revamping of the reform; both at the legislative and executive level, the California 
state government is overwhelmingly Democratic. With all key players from one 
party, the drafting of the bill and then – after the veto – the re-drafting and ultimate 
signing still proved to be long and arduous. 
211 See Emerson, supra note 15, at 644 & 659-663 (examining the federal and state 
legal environment surrounding franchises and how the current legal standards 
employed for the franchising relationship are inadequate). 
212 S.B. 422, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2016).
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215 OHIO REV. CODE § 1334.02 (2012). 
216 G. Jack Donson, Jr. & Margaret A. Lawson, Franchise Laws Protect Investors,
OHIO ST. BAR ASSOC. (March 2, 2016).
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agreement “under duress,” 218 it is clear that these reforms, on a 
national scale, would benefit the franchisee and offer a more level-
playing field.
Iowa and Michigan, like Wisconsin, pose two other examples of 
franchise relationship regulation.219 Few other states directly regulate 
a relationship220 that often skews strongly in favor of the franchisor.221
This reticence to regulate comes despite the fact that the franchise 
relationship is of enormous economic importance – one of mutual 
benefits and obligations between the two contractual parties. 
Accordingly, the Michigan Franchise Investment Law (MFIL)222 has 
been described as “an act to regulate the offer, sale, and purchase of 
franchises; to prohibit fraudulent practices in relation thereto; to 
prohibit pyramid and chain promotions; to impose regulatory duties 
upon certain state departments and agencies; and to provide
penalties.”223 Michigan thereby replaces the “old laissez faire regime” 
with a “pre-contract disclosure regime.”224
Under the MFIL definition,225 the franchisee is the “sole employer 
of the workers paid by the franchisee.”226 This has given more power 
and independence to the franchisee. For instance, unless “the 
franchisee and franchisor share in the determination of or codetermine 
the matters governing the essential terms and conditions of the 
                                                
218 Infra Appendix, Survey on Franchise Agreements, Question 9 (comments on 
file with authors).
219 IOWA CODE § 523H (2007). The Iowa legislature enacted the strongest 
legislation ever to protect franchisees. Paul Steinberg & Gerald Lecastre, Beguiling 
Heresy: Regulating the Franchise Relationship, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 105, 259 
(2004)
220 Steinberg & Lecastre, supra note 219, at 294–95; Emerson, supra note 15, at 
671.
221 Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Savoir-Faire, 90 TUL. L. REV. 589, 603–04 
(2016); Robert W. Emerson, Franchising Constructive Termination: Quirk, Quagmire 
or a French Solution? 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 163, 202 (2015).
222 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §445.1501 (2017).
223 Michigan Legislature, Michigan Compiled Laws Complete Through PA 197 of 
2016, Act 269 of 1974. 
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/(S(usj4o1sdeaandr4gqdqucioq))/mileg.aspx?page=g
etobject&objectname=mcl-act-269-of-1974.
224 Howard Yale Lederman, Franchising and Franchise Law: An Introduction, 92 
MICH. B.J. 34, 37 (Jan. 2013).
225 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §445.1504(b) (2017).
226 Paul R. Fransway, Change to Michigan Law Provides Some Protection for 
Franchisors, NAT’L. L. REV. (Apr. 14, 2016).
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employee’s employment” 227 during the franchise agreement 
negotiations, the franchisee and franchisor under the MFIL are 
excluded as being “joint employers.” 228 Before the FTC and state 
legislatures began addressing legal issues regarding franchisors and 
franchisees, such as through the FTC Rule 229 and any state 
equivalents, there were fewer legal standards for evaluating the 
franchising concepts. The franchisee’s recourse against a franchisor –
any avenues toward franchisor liability – were even more dominated 
by antitrust law and common law misrepresentation principles.230
B. Can the Level of Disclosure Rise to the Level Mandated by the 
SEC?
The first states that enacted franchise regulation laws modeled their 
legislation on federal securities law.231 However, courts have been 
reluctant to assess important factors in securities law, such as scienter,
when deciding securities disclosure requirement cases. 232 Instead, 
courts have focused on materiality without drawing a bright-line 
                                                
227 BILL ANALYSIS, APPLICATION OF EMPLOYMENT RULES TO FRANCHISEES,
HOUSE FISCAL AGENCY,
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2015-
2016/billanalysis/house/archive/2015-HLA-5070-18F6DC69.htm (last visited Dec. 
20, 2018).
228 David L. Steinberg, Derek D. McLeod & Emily M. Mayer, Uncertainty 
Abounds: The Joint Employer Doctrine and the Franchise Business Model, MICH.
B.J., 26, 27 (May 2017). 
229 See 16 C.F.R. § 436 (2018); Franchise Rule Compliance Guide, supra note 32.
230 See ROBERT L. PURVIN, THE FRANCHISE FRAUD: HOW TO PROTECT YOURSELF 
BEFORE AND AFTER YOU INVEST 36-51 (1994) (discussing franchise fraud and the 
history of franchising as a business arrangement); Mario L. Herman, A BRIEF 
HISTORY OF FRANCHISING, http://www.franchise-law.com/franchise-law-
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231 Peter C. Lagarias & Bruce J. Napell, Lessons from Thucydides on 
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Actions, 35 FRANCHISE L.J. 601, 613 (2016).
232 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018). In order to make out a Rule 10b-5 claim, a 
plaintiff must show that there was (1) a misrepresentation or actionable omission of 
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rule.233 This is particularly important for franchising cases concerning 
allegedly fraudulent representations made under a sale of business 
agreement; there, state supreme courts have decided that federal and 
state franchise disclosure requirements do not apply and thus have 
limited the parties to reliance upon the common law of contracts.234
The FTC Franchise Rule is distinctly narrow in that it does not regulate 
the ongoing franchisor-franchisee relationship, nor does it require the 
franchisor to register or file the FDD with the FTC.235 Because the 
FTC Franchise Rule preempts state franchise law only if the state law 
“fail[s] to provide equal or greater protection than the [Rule],” it is up 
to state legislators and regulators whether to bolster protections beyond 
the “minimum federal standard.”236 This should be a cause of concern 
for prospective franchisees in states without additional disclosure 
protections, especially those who are trying to “make sure they [don’t] 
get screwed”237 or to avoid “fees charged that were not disclosed.”238
Contrary to the FTC Franchise Rule, the Securities Exchange Act 
was designed to provide investors with full disclosure of material 
information concerning public offerings of securities in commerce, to 
protect investors against fraud and, through the imposition of specified 
civil liabilities, to promote ethical standards of honesty and fair 
dealing.239 As a public policy response to an aspiring franchisee’s 
cognitive biases, perhaps future federal legislation should mirror the 
Securities Exchange Act or other laws requiring extensive company 
registration, especially any heightened disclosure requirements for 
financial statements, in order to protect the investor-franchisee from a 
franchisor’s possible deception or the franchisee’s own mistakes in 
interpretation. Case law verifies that the “boundary between mere 
                                                
233 Stefan J. Padfield, Immaterial Lies, Condoning Deceit in the Name of Securities 
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‘puffing’ and negligent misrepresentation may become blurry.” 240
Franchisees have been unsuccessful in their actions against franchisors 
where representations concerning the future profitability of an owned 
business were at issue, because “an action for fraud may not be 
predicated upon the expression of an opinion or salesmen’s talk in 
promoting a sale, referred to as puffing.” 241 To clarify the line 
between franchise disclosure puffery and negligent misrepresentation, 
and to prevent cognitive biases (such as optimism bias) from
overshadowing the decision-making process, federal and state 
legislatures or regulators should propose statutes or rules to combat the 
imbalance of both bargaining power and information that exists 
between franchisees and franchisors.242
C. Anchoring and Nudging
In Franchising: Trap for the Trusting, longtime, leading franchise 
lawyer Harold Brown described how potential franchisees react to a 
notably attractive advertisement and are convinced to sign a franchise 
agreement without receiving any legal or financial advice from a 
franchise attorney.243 This “anchoring” to unrelated information could 
cognitively bias a prospective franchisee so that he or she falls victim 
to a number of appeals made by the franchisor, such as dissatisfaction 
with existing employment and popularity of a well-known 
personality. 244 Another example would be budding franchisees 
believing, as an unsophisticated consumer often would, that the 
                                                
240 ELIZABETH CARPENTIER & NATALMA M. MCKNEW, 29 S.C. JUR. PRIVATE 
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reputational brand of a franchise carries over to the consumer’s 
perception of the franchise as a whole.245 Anchoring could very likely 
be considered enough of a predictable cognitive bias that it leads to 
decision-making which franchisors see as beneficial.246 Any attempt 
to foster such presumably better behavior may be called nudging.247
A nudge is when one party encourages another by subliminal or 
like conduct to promote a particular result. In The Ethics of Nudging,
Cass Sunstein analyzed and explored how governments have used 
nudging to promote the general welfare.248 But, if nudging is used to 
undermine the general welfare, it can, arguably, give rise to conduct 
that would violate consumer protection laws. For example, in the 
United Kingdom, a “Nudge Unit” was established to use nudge theory 
to better government programs 249 and change the behaviors of its 
people. 250 What resulted were 100,000 additional registered organ 
donors a year and a doubling of the number of Army Reserve 
applicants after a large number of people initially expressed interest 
and then later dropped out.251 This Nudge Unit used tactics such as 
reciprocity-based messaging on registration websites and appeals to 
personal experiences.252
In franchise relationships, the franchisor nudges the franchise
candidate to focus on particular elements of the disclosure documents 
to increase the likelihood of the franchisee signing the agreement. 
From a legal point of view, while nudging’s ethical grounding is 
problematic, mounting legal challenges to the nudging would normally 
be a steep hill to climb. A key component of nudging is the fact that 
                                                
245 See Steinberg and Lecastre, supra note 219, at 155.
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the final decision lies with the individual, that is, in our case, with a
would-be franchisee.253 The encouraged (“nudged”) behavior is for a
potential franchisee to continue anchoring onto extraneous
information which would eventually give the franchisor’s business a 
boost in advertising and other franchising fields. In the franchise 
business model, a franchisor earns royalties while a franchisee hopes 
to succeed under the franchisor’s brand.254 Thus, it appears highly 
likely that prospective franchisees would take on even more business 
opportunities as long as there were sufficiently numerous and enticing 
incentives created by the franchisor, with the franchisee given the
ultimate decision.255
Advocates for franchisee rights may question certain types of 
nudging conduct, such as franchisor encouragement or manipulation
of potential franchisees into latching onto irrelevant data in hopes of 
having them sign the franchise agreement. Arguably, this conduct is 
patently exploitative and undermines the FTC’s purchaser-rights 
mission: prevention of anticompetitive business practices and the 
promotion of consumer protection. 256 Still, unless combined with 
other, typically overt misconduct (manifest falsehoods, not merely 
diversions or hyperbole), it is difficult to see how the nudge connotes,
let alone denotes, all the elements necessary to prove fraud in the 
inducement.257 So, to challenge nudging would likely require either 
imaginative theories of the common law or, more likely, new 
legislation or regulation directed at the specific behavior that nudging 
entails.
D. Rules from an International Perspective
                                                
253 See Emerson, supra note 55, at 147. 
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256 About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc (last 
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Franchising constitutes a possible entry mode into foreign 
markets. 258 Many nations have their own, distinct rules for when 
someone is looking to buy a franchise. For example, Malaysia requires 
franchisors to provide disclosure documents only ten days before the 
franchisee can sign a franchise agreement. 259 Additionally, a 
franchisor in Malaysia is required to disclose some information not 
required in the United States, such as the organizations in which it is a 
member, its management structure, and a list of its suppliers and all 
franchisees. 260 In comparison, Mexico mandates a longer review 
period, with prospective franchisees having at least thirty business 
days to review a disclosure document before a franchise agreement can 
be signed.261 Some view this as a challenge to franchising in Mexico 
because it creates a mandatory lag time in the franchising process.262
However, when prospective franchisees must make an important 
decision, such as whether to invest in a franchise, perhaps the thirty-
days-to-review rule in Mexico is a good place to start when it comes 
to reforming some of the franchising laws in the United States. With 
only fourteen days required to review a FDD in the United States,263
franchise applicants could be pinched for time when it comes to 
finding and consulting an attorney, or – in order to gain better insight 
– discussing their arrangement with family and friends. With more
time on their hands before signing an agreement, prospective 
franchisees should be more likely to make smart decisions and less 
prone to post-signing regrets stemming from something they later 
learn—in effect, this mitigates the harm from cognitive biases.
1. Rescission and Disclosure
With regard to rescission and disclosure, Raibex Canada Ltd. v. 
ASWR Franchising Corp., a rescission action in Canada, provides an 
                                                
258 Veronica Baena, Insights on International Franchising: Entry Mode Decision,
14 LATIN AM. BUS. REV., Jan.–Mar. 2013, at 2.
259 See Adhuna Kamarul Ariffin et al., Franchising in Malaysia, WILEY REIN, LLP
(Apr. 7, 2015), https://www.wileyrein.com/newsroom-newsletters-item-5275.html.
260 Id.




263 Federal Trade Commission, Amended Franchise Rule 16 C.F.R. Part 436 
FAQ’s (July 2, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-
center/guidance/amended-franchise-rule-faqs#22; see supra Section II.C.
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interesting analysis. 264 In this case, the franchisees brought a 
rescission claim under the “Fair Dealing” and “Damages for 
Misrepresentation, Failure to Disclose” sections of Ontario’s Arthur 
Wishart Act. 265 The plaintiff franchisee’s claim was based on a 
number of alleged deficiencies, namely the failure to disclose a copy 
of the head lease and cost estimates for location development in the 
provided FDD.266 The Ontario Superior Court of Justice found that 
the franchisor was “not yet ready to deliver the statutorily required 
disclosure document” and that the franchisor “must wait” and “does 
not get excused from its statutory obligations.”267 Both parties to this 
case appealed.268
2. Psychometric Tests
In order to determine whether a candidate would be a suitable 
franchisee, a franchisor may look to the results of the prospective 
franchisee’s E-Test.269 The E-Test is a psychometric test that is a key 
predictor of potential franchisee success.270 After rating a series of 
statements that pertain to the applicant, including organizational and 
leadership competencies, the franchisor assesses the report and 
determines whether the aspiring franchisee is a good fit for the 
                                                
264 Raibex Canada Ltd. v. ASWR Franchising Corp., 2016 CanLII 5575 (Can. Ont. 
S.C.); see also CORBY ANDERSON & CLAY TILLACK, ANNUAL FRANCHISE AND
DISTRIBUTION LAW DEVELOPMENTS 290 (2017).
265 See ANDERSON & TILLACK, supra note 264, at 290. See also Arthur Wishart 
Act, S.O. 2000, c 3 (Can.) (“For the purpose of this section [§3], the duty of fair 
dealing includes the duty to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable 
commercial standards and §7 Damages for Misrepresentation, Failure to Disclose”; 
further holding that when a franchisee suffers a loss from a misrepresentation 
contained in the disclosure document or in a statement of a material change or due 
to the franchisor’s failure to comply with §5, the franchisee has a right of action for 
damages against the franchisor and every person who signed the disclosure 
document or statement of material change).
266 See ANDERSON & TILLACK, supra note 264, at 290; but see 2212886 Ontario v. 
Obsidian Group, 2017 CanLII 1643 (Can. Ont. S.C.), cited in ANDERSON &
TILLACK, supra note 264, at 291 (holding that the franchisor’s failure to provide a 
copy of a head lease did not constitute grounds for rescission; the franchisee’s 
motion for partial summary judgment was nonetheless granted because the 
defendant failed to properly disclose earnings projections outside of the FDD).
267 Raibex Canada Ltd. v. ASWR Franchising Corp., 2016 CanLII 5575 at 78 
(Can. Ont. S.C.); see also ANDERSON & TILLACK, supra note 264.
268 ANDERSON & TILLACK, supra note 264.
269 FranchisingPlus, Interviewing for Success (Feb. 28, 2017), 
http://www.franchisingplus.co.za/news-articles/243-interviewing-for-success.
270 Id.
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operation. 271 Grant Amos from Franchise Chat compares 
administering psychometric tests to understanding the manner in 
which a person’s abilities, personal style, and ideal working 
environment can predict how that person will perform a given task, 
such as driving.272
Psychometric tests were the subject of a Quebec court case,
Quebec Inc. v. Franchises Cora, in which Quebec Inc. applied to be a 
franchisee of Franchises Cora, Inc.273 The franchisor administered a 
psychometric test to evaluate Quebec Inc.’s principal operator-owner,
but the franchisor failed to send the test score results to that person,
despite her requests.274 Nevertheless, Quebec Inc. agreed to operate a 
restaurant location subject to the approval of the franchisor.275 The 
restaurant only lasted a year before being forced to close, and the 
franchisee, Quebec Inc., sued Franchises Cora to have the franchise 
agreement terminated.276 The franchisee’s principal argued that the 
franchisee would not have entered into the agreement if she had 
known, inter alia, the results of her psychometric test, and therefore 
the agreement should be considered fraudulent and in error.277
The franchisee’s suit was dismissed at the trial level. However,
upon review, the Quebec Court of Appeals found that the respondent 
did not fulfill its duty to inform under the Quebec Civil Code.278 It 
held that a franchisor must provide a franchisee or prospective 
franchisee with all the information which could “significantly 
influence” its consent to contract.279 The Quebec Court of Appeals 
still dismissed the appeal because the trial judge had found the 
franchisee would have entered into the agreement with Franchises 
Cora (the franchisor) even if the results of the psychometric test had 
                                                
271 Id.
272 Amos, supra note 125, at 16.
273 See Bruno Floriani, Courts Rule on the Duty to Inform (July 16, 2013), citing 








278 See Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c 64, art 1375 (Can.) (“The parties shall 
conduct themselves in good faith both at the time the obligation arises and at the 
time it is performed or extinguished.”).
279 Floriani, supra note 273.
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been presented to the franchisee. 280 The case highlights the 
importance of the franchisor’s duty to inform during the pre-
contractual stage of the franchisee-franchisor negotiation process
abroad, and the need to strengthen legislation at the national level to 
incorporate franchise-specific disclosure protections, as seen in some 
U.S. states and in other Canadian provinces.281
3. Increasing Pre-Agreement Franchisee Protections
A good place to start for many jurisdictions with little to no 
franchisee protections would be to examine the United States’ 
Franchise Rule requiring franchisors to disclose all required 
information clearly, legibly and in plain English for comprehensibility 
to both parties, but especially to prospective franchisees.282 As noted 
in a 2015 federal case in Illinois, Sanchez v. CleanNet USA,283 many 
persons signing a franchise agreement do not read or speak the English
language and may, to fully understand the agreement, need a 
translation to their native tongue.284 However, the court held that a 
franchisor’s failure to translate the entire franchise agreement into 
Spanish (the franchisee’s native tongue), or at least to take every 
material provision of the agreement and explain it in Spanish, did not 
render unenforceable a challenged provision in that agreement.285
In the Sanchez case, the court commented upon the differences 
between the facts present before it and in a 2012 federal district court 
case from California, Cisneros v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., in which the 
terms of a franchise agreement were found to be procedurally 
unconscionable. In Cisneros, the plaintiff could not write, read, or 
speak English at the time of the transaction, and was unable to locate 
a translator.286 The Cisneros court also analyzed the fact that because 
the franchisee knew of no other way to make the sales representative 
                                                
280 Id.
281 See Andraya Frith, Eric Prefontaine & Gillian Scott, La Belle Province: A
Practical Business Guide to Key Legal Issues When Franchising in Quebec, 36 
FRAN. L.J. 303, 314–15 (Fall 2016).
282 See The Franchise Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 436.6(b) (2007). 
283 Sanchez v. CleanNet USA, 78 F. Supp. 3d 747 (N.D. Ill. 2015).
284 Id. at 754.
285 Id. (In extreme cases, the franchisee’s limited language skills, with little 
education and little to no fluency in English, may be a basis for court intervention 
in the face of onerous, franchisor-imposed contract terms); see also Awuah v. 
Coverall N. Am., Inc., 554 F.3d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 2009).
286 Id. at 755, citing Cisneros v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., 2012 WL 3025913 (N.D. 
Cal. 2012).
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on her premises leave her home, the agreement that was signed was 
procedurally unconscionable.287
Because the Sanchez facts were noticeably different from
Cisneros, the Sanchez court was unpersuaded, and it rejected the 
franchisee’s argument.288 However, legal practitioners should still be 
on notice that, by voluntarily providing franchisees some additional 
pre-agreement protections, franchisors actually may increase not just 
the likelihood of the franchisee’s success in business, but perhaps also
heighten the franchisor’s potential liability if the disclosure remains 
inadequate in terms of true informational value (the Cisneros
approach). As a California state court of appeals remarked, to consider 
a franchise agreement procedurally or substantively unconscionable, 
courts must weigh factors such as (1) whether the franchise agreement 
is “difficult to read,” (2) whether the franchisees “lacked 
sophistication”289 such that they did not understand the terms of the 
franchise agreement, and (3) especially, whether the franchisees 
lacked comparable, alternative business opportunities.290
                                                
287 Cisneros, 2012 WL 3025913 at 2.
288 Sanchez, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 755.
289 For a discussion on sophistication, see Meredith R. Miller, Contract Law, Party 
Sophistication and the New Formalism, 75 MO. L. REV. 493, 519 (2010). In the 
franchising context, see Emerson, supra note 38, at 733-37, 738 n.172 (discussing 
both court decisions and state legislation to protect unsophisticated franchisees 
from the unfair practices of their franchisor); Robert W. Emerson, Franchising and 
the Collective Rights of Franchisees, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1503, 1511, 1555 (1990) 
(noting that state franchise legislation reflects the lawmakers’ recognition “that 
franchisors possess most of the bargaining power and may abuse this power,” and 
concluding that most franchisors “have a significant advantage in resources –
money, information, political influence, business experience, and access to 
professional advice”); Robert W. Emerson, Franchising and the Parol Evidence 
Rule, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 659, 698-725 (2013) (discussing various relational contract 
issues related to franchising, including the sophistication vel non of franchisees as 
well as the differences between franchising and other commercial contracts); Peter 
C. Lagarias & Robert S. Boulter, The Modern Reality of the Controlling 
Franchisor: The Case for More, Not Less, Franchisee Protections, 29 FRANCHISE 
L.J. 139, 140, 143 (2010) (referring to opportunistic franchisor behavior through 
territorial encroachment, enforcement of contract clauses, and franchise 
nonrenewal or termination).
290 See Indep. Ass’n of Mailbox Ctr. Owners, Inc. v. Superior Court, 133 Cal. App. 
4th 396, 410 (2005). For discussion of an extreme set of circumstances, involving 
recent immigrants with limited business knowledge, meager English language 
skills, and little if any outside advice before the signing of their “franchise” 
agreements, and a series of court holdings labeling these extremely naïve, 
disadvantaged “franchisees” to be, in fact, simply the franchisor’s employees, see
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In fact, taking these unconscionability factors into consideration, a 
parallel may exist between prospective franchising and signature loan 
borrowing. The Supreme Court of New Mexico in 2014 held that the 
practices of subprime lenders were procedurally unconscionable under 
the state’s Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA)291 because there was 
substantial evidence that borrowers lacked knowledge, experience, 
ability, or capacity in credit transactions. 292 In addition, statistical 
evidence proved that prospective New Mexican borrowers had 
significantly less education than the general population and had 
“behavioral and cognitive biases” that worked to their detriment in
making credit decisions.293 These biases are some of the very biases 
that this article analyzed, such as optimism bias, fundamental 
attribution error, framing, and anchoring; and each type of bias was 
exhibited in the borrowers’ testimony.294 Considering that the New 
Mexico Supreme Court admitted expert testimony to address cognitive 
biases attributed to the borrowers to decide upon the signed 
agreement’s fairness or unconscionability under the UPA, this 
example could serve jurisdictions well in evaluating the biases that 
franchise candidates fall into that are akin to those of loan 
borrowers.295 In both franchising and consumer-lending situations, 
the more experienced, educated, and capable party to the agreement 
has the opportunity to leverage its know-how over the less experienced 
“buyer,” a power dynamic of asymmetry that should be taken into 
great consideration in developing a more equitable arrangement both 
domestically and internationally.296
                                                
Robert W. Emerson, Assessing Awuah v. Coverall North America, Inc.: The 
Franchisee as a Dependent Contractor, 19 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 203 (2014).
291 Unfair Practices Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-12-1—57-12-26 (2018) (a New 
Mexico consumer protection statute).




295 Id. The State of New Mexico presented an expert, Christopher Peterson, a law 
professor and associate dean at the University of Utah who specializes in consumer 
finance, specifically in high-cost, small-principal loans. Id. at 665 n.3. Professor 
Peterson testified that the borrowers had “unrealistic expectations,” were 
“susceptible to distort[ed] perception of costs,” and were subject to “information 
overload,” meaning that “when they are presented with a complex loan agreement, 
they cease trying to understand the terms at all…” Id. at 666.
296 Robert W. Emerson, South African Franchisees as Consumers: The South 
African Example, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 455 (2014). (That is, generally, the pro-
franchisee approach of South Africa’s Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”),
Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (S. Afr.), which expressly considers 
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4. Stricter Franchising Regulations in China: The “Two-for-
One” Example
In the last twenty years, franchising has grown dramatically in 
China, both from a boom in domestic franchise networks and through 
the rapid entrance of foreign franchisors into the Chinese market.297
In 1997, China issued Interim Measures on Regulating Commercial 
Franchise Operations, and, ten years later, these regulations were 
“refined.”298 Three types of franchise contracts can be established in 
China: single unit franchise agreements, master franchise agreements, 
and regional development agreements. 299 With an emphasis on 
countering franchisee foibles and difficulties, Chinese franchise law 
represents the type of proactive legislation intended to compensate for 
disparities in bargaining power and, at least partially, franchisees’ 
cognitive biases.300 On its fact, it goes farther in affording franchisees 
some substantive protections – required practices – than found in most 
Western nations that have enacted franchise laws.301
No matter the type of franchise set up, companies in China must 
meet the “two-for-one” rule. 302 This rule stipulates that foreign 
franchisors must open and operate at least two units in China or 
                                                
franchisees to be consumers, deserving of the CPA’s extensive protections. Almost 
every other nation makes distinctions between these two categories and accords 
more protection to ordinary consumers than to franchisees, who are considered to 
be businesspersons, instead).
297 See Richard Hoffmann, How to Set Up a Franchise in China, ECOVIS BEIJING
(January 4, 2017), https://perma.cc/JL4T-DM6R.
298 Id.
299 Id.
300 See Lin Xiao ( ), Shu Ping: Wai Zi Qi Yie Cong Shi Te Xü Jing Ying Guan 
Li Ban Fa ( ) [Review: Foreign-funded 
Enterprises Engaged in Franchise Management Measures] (2004), 
https://perma.cc/XG6T-QZYX. The reasons for franchisee’s losses are: (1) the 
franchisor lacks the well-established business mode in Chinese market, and (2) 
small investors lack crucial information about the franchisor’s financial records and 
business experience. Id.
301 See Ella S.K. Cheong, China, in INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING CHN/1,
CHN/4-10 (Dennis Campbell ed., 2nd ed. 2017) (describing numerous Chinese laws 
imposing duties on the franchisor to provide certain contractual rights of the 
franchisee and duties of the franchisor). 
302 William Edwards, The Pros and Cons of Franchising in China, CHINESE BUS.
REV. (July 1, 2011),
https://perma.cc/SEA2-WL5S.
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anywhere else in the world for at least one year before forming a 
franchise in China.303 As a result, franchisors and franchisees (who 
may want to sub-franchise to a third party) learn to manage their 
businesses correctly before selling franchise rights to another party.304
The “two-for-one” rule is essentially a precaution for those who 
may want to undertake a franchise; an uncertain franchisee or sub-
franchisee may very well want the original franchisor or franchisee to 
have added experience before taking on a significant business 
investment. The rule also provides an opportunity to ensure that the 
franchisor’s system functions in a new market.305
Although principally designed to protect franchisees,306 the “two-
for-one” rule is to be interpreted within the context of norms and 
practices in franchising generally or within a particular franchised 
industry. 307 There are three matters courts must consider when 
deciding whether a new franchisor’s outlets have established a 
successful business model for a market, and thus have satisfied the 
two-for-one requirements: the franchisor’s two (or more) outlets and 
the potential franchisee should (1) operate in the same or similar 
                                                
303 Zhong Guo Shang Ye Te Xu Jing Ying Guan Li Tiao Li (
) [Regulations for the Administration of Commercial Franchising 
Operations] ST. COUNCIL GAZETTE (May 23, 2007), https://perma.cc/5T4A-7TGE 
(promulgated by the St. Council, Jan. 31, 2007, effective May 1, 2007).
304 Edwards, supra note 302.
305 Id. Cultures and practices can vary from region to region. Despite any variation, 
there is no promise on the franchisor’s part to adapt the trademark or processes to 
accommodate that new region. Through legislation, China was able to require 
franchisors to make that adjustment at the franchisor’s own expense. 
306 See Jiang Zengwei ( ), Vice Minister, Ministry of Com., Jiang Zeng Wei 
Fu Bu Zhang Zai Di Jie Zhong Guo Te Xu (
) [Taking the Opportunity of Implementing the Regulations on 
Commercial Franchising Management to Promote Better and Faster Development 
of Commercial Franchising], Wei Qi Ji Tui Dong Shang Ye Te Xü Xu Jing Ying 
Geng Hao Geng Kuai De Fa Zhan ( )
[Speech at the 9th China Franchise Conference] (Mar. 25, 2007) (transcript 
available at https://perma.cc/R3H6-V6DY).
307 Tao Jun ( ), Te Xü Jing Ying Jiu Fen Zhong Guan Yu Liang Dian Yi Nian 
Gui Ding De Li Jie Yu Shi Yong ( ” ”
) [Understanding and Application of the "Two Stores a Year" Rule in 
Franchise Disputes] (2013), https://perma.cc/MD26-4E5M.
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business area308, (2) have the same business model309, and (3) have the 
same franchising resources. 310 Failure to meet the “two-for-one” 
requirement is subject to administrative penalties, including fines,
public announcements, an order to cease, confiscation of illegal 
income, and confiscation of illegal profits.311 However, unless the 
violation of the “two-for-one” rules is egregious (typically, with other 
substantive violations312 or fraud313), franchise agreements themselves 
                                                
308 Shang Wubu Liu Tong Fa Zhan Si ( ) [The Ministry of 
Commerce, People’s Republic of China], Shang Ye Te Xü Jing Ying Wen Ti Jie 
Da ( ) [Business Franchise Questions and Answers] 
(2012), 
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zhengcejd/bp/201212/20121208472194.shtml.
309 Id. (I.e., online shops should be treated differently in some situations).
310 Id. Those resources, as defined by China’s Ministry of Commerce, are all 
resources that can bring benefits to the franchise parties and are protected by 
exclusive rights and measures, including a franchisor’s brands and trademarks.
311 Id. Article 24 of the 2007 Regulation states:
A franchisor, who is unqualified under Section 2 of Article 7, yet conducts
franchising operations, shall be subject to an ordered correction from 
commerce regulatory authorities, confiscation of profits, a monetary fine 
between 100,000 and 500,000 yuan, and a public reprimand. Entities or 
individuals other than in registered enterprises, who conduct franchising 
operations, shall be subject to an order from regulatory authority to cease 
illegal operations, confiscation of profits, and a monetary fine between
100,000 and 500,000 yuan.
Regulations for the Administration of Commercial Franchising Operations
supra note 303.
312 Xiaomin Li & Xianbao Song ( ), Shang Ye Te Xü Jing Ying 
He Tong Jiu Fen Te You Wen Ti Si Fa Shi Zheng Yan Jiu (
) [Judicial Empirical Study on the Unique Issues of 
Commercial Franchise Contract Disputes] (2016), https://perma.cc/M8QM-
DHNM; see Luo Guangjian ( ), Jie Du Shang Ye Ting Xü Jing Ying Guan 
Li Tiao Li ( ) [Interpretation of the Commercial 
Franchise Management Regulations] (2007), https://perma.cc/6JNC-SWDX. The 
documents that should be filed according to the Regulation include, among others, 
the documents showing that the franchisor has met the “2 for 1” requirement. See 
Li & Song, supra. Once the department of commerce receives the filing materials 
from the franchisor, it has the duty to notify the franchisor, keep the documents in 
record, and publicize the record on the government’s website. Guangjian, supra.
313 Li & Song, supra note 312. The franchisor’s failure to file the required 
documents and the failure to disclose it to the franchisee constitutes fraud, and the 
court can hold the agreement invalid based on that failure to disclose. Guangjian, 
supra note 312.
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may not be rendered invalid.314 In a 2016 case, the Supreme Court of 
China held that whether failure to meet the “two-for-one” requirement 
constituted fraud depended on the totality of the circumstances: the 
franchisor’s qualifications, the false or deceptive materials provided 
by the franchisor, the facts that the franchisor failed to disclose, and all 
of the misinformation’s and missing information’s influence on the 
agreement. 315 The Court’s focus on the overall purpose of the 
franchisor’s filing – keeping the government informed about the 
franchisor’s qualifications and facilitating governmental supervision316
– means that a franchisee’s claims of fraud and desire for rescission or 
other relief are a secondary matter for any court review of an alleged 
“two-for-one” violation. For example, even if the franchisor failed to 
file anything related to “two-for-one,” as long as that failure was 
disclosed to the franchisee, then the franchisee has no grounds for 
requesting that a court invalidate the franchise agreement.317
The United States welcomed China’s action and has been 
“monitoring developments in this area” since the regulations were 
issued.318 However, those wishing to enter into China for franchising 
business would be “well advised to closely monitor the franchise 
regulatory developments.” 319 Zeidman and Xu further believe that 
businesspersons can reasonably expect a tighter regulatory 
environment in China, as many of the more liberal business franchising 
                                                
314 Li & Song, supra note 312 (citing Jian Gao v. Beijing Tian Hong Jian Hua Qi 
Ye Guan Li You Xian Gong Si (2016)). In Jian Gao, the Supreme Court of China 
held that whether the failure to meet “two for one” requirement constituted fraud 
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information that the franchisor failed to disclose, the false or deceptive information 
provided by the franchisor, and those information’s influence on the agreement; 
however, the Court reasoned that the purpose of filing was to keep the government 
informed of the qualification of the franchisor and facilitate the government’s 
supervision. Jian Gao. The franchisor cannot complete the filing without 
documents showing the satisfaction of “2 for 1.” Zengwei, supra note 306.
However, the purpose of filing is to protect the benefits and interests of the 
franchisee and facilitate the supervision of the franchisor); Guangjian, supra note 
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315 Jian Gao v. Beijing Tian Hong Jian Hua Qi Ye Guan Li You Xian Gong Si 
(2016) (cited in Li & Song, supra note 312).
316 See Zengwei, supra note 306.
317 Id.
318 INT’L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF COM., 2016 TOP MARKETS REPORT
FRANCHISING COUNTRY CASE STUDY: CHINA 2 (2016).
319 Philip F. Zeidman & Tao Xu, China Updates its Franchise Filing and 
Disclosure Rules: A Mixed Bag, DLA PIPER (2012), https://perma.cc/R5EZ-U343].
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rules have not become part of China’s revised franchising rules.320
Changes encompass the mandate that franchisors include more details 
about support, guidance, and services within a disclosure document 
and that prospective franchisees keep a franchisor’s information 
strictly confidential, no matter if there was an agreement entered into 
between a franchisor and the franchisee.321 These changes exemplify 
the stricter regulatory nature of franchising in China in comparison to 
the United States.322
VII. CONCLUSION
Human cognition has often been shown to be biased and easily 
influenced by external stimuli. 323 Whether it is making a tough 
business decision or recalling a fond memory from one’s youth, there 
is evidence throughout history that the human conscience is strongly 
influenced by stimuli in a way that lacks rationality or even common 
sense.324 Over time, the human mind has evolved to incorporate “past 
environments.”325 It is these environments that influence our structure 
and representation of information on one side of the mind, while the 
other side of the mind involves heuristics and decision-making 
algorithms.326 In this article’s study and survey, questions about expert 
advice and opinion (Question 1), reliance on specific information 
(Question 2), past involvement and success (Questions 3, 4 and 5), 
non-expert advice and opinion (Question 6), a choice of alternatives 
(Question 7), and the seeking of additional information post-decision 
(Question 8), were all asked and tested to evaluate our initial 
hypothesis that cognitive biases influence potential franchisees. The 
results of the research study indicate that our hypothesis was partially 
true, with our predicted biases especially apparent when examining the 
free-responses of 200-plus franchisees who offered their input.
What our research has shown is that three out of every four 
franchisees consider their previous franchise successful, with a 
majority that did not rely on friends or a family member in deciding 




323 Martie G. Haselton & Daniel Nettle, The Paranoid Optimist: An Integrative 
Evolutionary Model of Cognitive Biases, 10 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV.
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324 See id.
325 Andreas Wilke & Rui Mata, Cognitive Bias, 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA HUM. BEHAV.
531, 533 (2012).
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whether or not to take on another franchise (over 53% had alternatives 
to select from). These answers demonstrate an independent streak that
runs through franchisees, highlighted by a few of their long-form 
answers from Question 9 of the survey. One franchisee noted that his 
contract with his franchisor is very “loosely written” and so he just 
“does his own thing with his franchise and territory.” Another had 
“little time to make a decision” and, after considering the alternative 
(becoming an employee of the firm offering the franchise), the 
franchisee decided that he did not want to be “beholden to the man” 
and made the decision to be a full-fledged franchisee. One franchisee, 
even after being an independent contractor for almost twenty years, 
still personally felt that he signed the agreement “under duress” 
because of “too many issues on (his) mind at the time” and chose not 
to hire an attorney. “Many franchisees discover only after the franchise 
contract is signed that franchisors ordinarily keep close control over 
the operations at each franchise.”327 Yet, as these examples show, 
before and after the franchise agreement is signed, franchisees are 
inclined to be like the Meineke franchisees in Broussard v. Meineke 
Discount Muffler Shops - independent, sophisticated, if sometimes 
small, businessmen who pursue their own business interests.328 To 
enter into a single-franchise agreement or to not enter into a single-
franchise agreement, that is the question. Through the eyes of a 
prospective franchisee who has just days to arrive at an important 
business decision, the decision-making process can be a strenuous one. 
“When two options are presented to us, bias can make us more 
sensitive to the appearance of gain or loss.” 329 The would-be 
franchisee may ask himself or herself, “What readily available 
information can help me make the best decision?” This is when the 
aspiring franchisee may hedge on one of the mental heuristics that lead 
to being influenced by cognitive biases.
In our study, one distinct bias—confirmation bias—was evident 
throughout the responses of the franchisees, hindering them from 
improving their circumstances by focusing on self-affirming
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2019] BOUND BY BIAS? 57
information and blinding them to other available ownership 
opportunities. This selective perception focusses on positive, yet 
useless, information and disregards negative information simply 
because that negative information may go against established beliefs. 
The initial information, from a franchisee, can lead franchisees further 
away from rational pursuit of the answers to pertinent questions. 
Specifically, they fail to ask the questions needed to decide how good 
or bad an investment it may be.330
Relying on outside information can have both positive and 
negative ramifications. Moreover, as the world economy becomes 
increasingly interdependent, each biased decision can have global 
implications. 331 Academic and business researchers will greatly 
benefit from uncovering improvement techniques in decision-
making.332 These findings will help bring to light instances where 
potential business owners, many of whom are inexperienced in 
business yet choose franchising as their first business venture, are 
entering into agreements while “very uninformed”333 and “through no 
one’s fault but [their] own.”334 Furthermore, these findings will help 
those prospective franchisees see the error in their reasoning and 
encourage them to participate in fair, arm’s length transactions with 
franchisors.
Cognitive biases exist in business franchising. The survey below 
makes that clear. Additional research that focuses on the psychology 
behind personal arrangements and legally-binding agreements will 
help to further expand and elaborate on this important area of business. 
For future research studies examining this unique area of franchising, 
we recommend analyzing the impact that buyer’s remorse has on the 
franchisee from the time that person signs an agreement to the time he 
or she relinquishes ownership of the business. Although the results of 
our study could be disputed due to low participant sample size, the 
responses that we received indicate that there may be a moderate 
number of past or current franchisees who feel that they have 
experienced buyer’s remorse at some point in their ownership 
experience. 
                                                
330 See Emerson, supra note 290, at 223.
331 See Katherine Milkman, Dolly Chugh & Max H. Bazerman, How Can Decision 
Making Be Improved?, 4 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 379, 379 (2009).
332 Id. at 380.
333 See infra Appendix, Survey on Franchise Agreements, Question 9 (comments 
on file with authors). 
334 Id.
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Another area of study would be to examine the positive as well as 
negative implications of having alternative franchises from which to 
choose. Herbert Simon, a theorist who laid the foundation for the study 
of managerial decision making, 335 stated that “complex 
circumstances, limited time, and inadequate mental computational 
power reduce decision makers to a state of bounded rationality.”336
Thus, we hope that this research study gives insight about the 
rationality and decision-making of business owners, and most 
importantly the prospective franchisee. 
There is still more to learn about the interactions between franchise 
applicants and their franchisor as they proceed, usually under the 
influence of cognitive biases, toward what is supposed to be a sound, 
rational, reasonable, informed decision, but in fact often is not. With a 
greater overall business understanding of these biases and – on an 
individual level – more franchisee self-awareness, 337 the highly 
consequential contracts and long-term business relationships between 
franchisors and franchisees can be more reasonably anticipated, 
precisely crafted, and successfully performed.
APPENDIX: A SURVEY ON FRANCHISE AGREEMENTS
The following is the “Survey on Franchise Agreements” that was 
distributed to the random population sample of franchisees across the 
United States, with results recorded from more than 200-plus 
respondents:
Dear ____________,
Information and Consent to Survey
My name is ______. I am a business law professor at _________, 
where I conduct research on various issues in franchise law. With the 
help of my assistant, _______, I am studying how franchise 
agreements are formed. I have developed a short survey (10 
questions), which should take about 10 minutes for you to complete.
Please understand that this project is solely for research purposes. 
No one except the researchers (student assistants and I) will have 
access to any of your responses. All responses will be kept 
confidential to the extent provided by law. Of course, your 
                                                
335 Leigh Buchanan & Andrew O’Connell, A Brief History of Decision Making,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 2006), https://perma.cc/F9R8-NBU2.
336 Id. See also Herbert Alexander Simon, 3 MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY:
EMPIRICALLY GROUNDED ECONOMIC REASON 291, 291 (1982).
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participation is voluntary. You do not have to answer any question(s) 
that you do not wish to answer. There is no penalty for non-
participation, and no anticipated risk or direct benefit associated with 
participation. All study data will be collected through an online 
survey-collection program called Qualtrics. Qualtrics is a secure site 
with SAS 70 certification for rigorous privacy standards. Any data 
that you provide through this program will be encrypted for security 
purposes using Secure Socket Layers (SSL). Only the study 
investigators will have access to the data on Qualtrics. To protect 
your privacy, all participants’ IP addresses will be masked by 
Qualtrics and will be unavailable to, and unidentifiable by, 
investigators or others. Qualtrics’ privacy policy can be obtained at 
http://www.qualtrics.com/privacy-statement. You will not receive 
any compensation for participating. You may withdraw your consent 
to participate without penalty at any time. Only the researchers will 
have access to data, and any link to your identification will be 
destroyed when the study is completed.
If you have any questions or comments about this research, 
please feel free to telephone me at ________, or my assistant at 
_________. I may also be reached at __________, and my assistant 
can be reached via email at ___________. Questions or concerns 
about research participants’ rights may be directed to the University 
of Florida IRB office at ___________.
By pressing “Reply,” and responding to this survey, you indicate 
that you have read the information above, and that you voluntarily 
agree to participate. Do you consent?
[Of those who responded, 98% indicated their consent and 2% 
responded “No”; those who responded “Yes” then proceeded to 
answer the remaining nine questions.]
1) Have you ever hired a franchise expert/attorney to assist you in 
your decision to operate a franchise?
# Answer Response %
1 Yes 61 30%
2 No 142 70%
Total 203 100%
2) Before entering into your franchise agreement, did you rely 
especially on a particular piece of information?
# Answer Response %
1 Yes 96 48%
2 No 105 52%
Total 201 100%
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[Of the ones relying on particular information, respondents 
specified as follows:]
# Answer Response %
1 FDD/UFOC 33 35%
2 Rest of Answers 60 65%
[e.g., “previous experience” or “had already worked in a 
franchise”]
Total 93 100%
3) Before acquiring your present franchise, did you own and/or 
operate one or more franchises?
# Answer Response %
1 Yes 14 7%
2 No 189 93%
Total 203 100%
4) If you answered “Yes” to the previous question - that, before 
acquiring your present franchise, you owned and/or operated one or 
more franchises - please answer these next two questions. 
Was the previous franchise in the same field as your current 
franchise?
# Answer Response %
1 Yes 8 29%
2 No 20 71%
Total 28 100%
5) Would you consider that previous franchise successful?
# Answer Response %
1 Yes 21 78%
2 No 6 22%
Total 27 100%
6) Before entering into a single franchise agreement, did you have 
friends or family that offered an opposing view as to whether you 
should enter into the agreement?
# Answer Response %
1 Yes 57 29%
2 No 141 71%
Total 198 100%
7) Before entering into a single franchise agreement, did you have 
alternatives besides the franchise you currently operate? 
If so, please briefly explain why you chose to operate this particular 
franchise.
# Answer Response %
1 Yes 107 53%
2 No 94 47%
Total 201 100%
8) After entering into your franchise agreement, did/do you find 
yourself seeking out more information about your agreement?
# Answer Response %
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1 Yes 70 35%
2 No 132 65%
Total 202 100%
9) Please use this space to further explain any of your answers to the 
previous questions, or to comment on anything else. 
[The respondents’ comments are reported, above, in this article.]

